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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite heated discussions in the media and on Capitol Hill, one climate 
change debate appears to be reaching a consensus: over ninety-seven percent 
of climate scientists now believe the world’s climate is warming as a result of 
human activity.1  In reaching an international agreement on climate change in 
Paris late last year, the United Nations called climate change “an urgent and 
potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet.”2  The Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change has concluded that continued human 
interference with climate systems will increase the likelihood of “severe, per-
vasive, and irreversible impacts,” including substantial species extinction, 
significant risks to food security, and temperature and humidity changes that 
may threaten normal human activity.3  In the United States, a recent White 
House report asserted that climate change caused by emissions of greenhouse 
gases – and carbon dioxide in particular – is to blame for increasingly fre-
quent and intense heat waves in the West and downpours in the Midwest and 
Northeast.4 
Growing concern about climate change has been used to rally support 
for government subsidies for renewable energy investment.5  Two important 
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nes, and members of the faculties at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of 
Law and the University of South Carolina School of Law for their comments on drafts 
of this Article.  Any mistakes that remain are my own. 
 1. William R. L. Anderegg et al., Expert Credibility in Climate Change, 107 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12107, 12107 (2010). 
 2. Adoption of the Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Dec. 12, 2015), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf. 
 3. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: 
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 14 (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar5/wg2/ar5_wgII_spm_en.pdf. 
 4. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., THE COST OF DELAYING 
ACTION TO STEM CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (July 2014) [hereinafter COST OF DELAYING 
ACTION], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/the_cost_of_delaying_
action_to_stem_climate_change.pdf. 
 5. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in 
the State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
1
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tax credits have been available to help subsidize renewable energy projects: 
the investment tax credit6 and the production tax credit.7  The two credits, 
which are mutually exclusive, serve similar roles in the renewable energy 
industry and face similar challenges.  This Article, however, will focus on the 
more controversial of the two: the production tax credit, which was recently 
extended by Congress.8  This Article argues that the production tax credit 
should be amended to make the credit refundable.  As explained below, a 
refundable version of the production tax credit would make it more effective 
and better able to promote market efficiency and fight climate change by 
eliminating the need for costly transactions currently used to monetize the 
credit. 
 
office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address (linking goals for increased 
renewable energy production to broader environmental policies to slow climate 
change). 
 6. See I.R.C. § 48 (West 2016).  The first of the two mutually exclusive tax 
incentives available to renewable energy projects – the investment tax credit – pre-
dates the present understanding of climate change.  The investment tax credit was first 
created in 1962 with the general goal of encouraging investments in productive assets.  
NOVOGRADAC & CO., RENEWABLE ENERGY TAX CREDIT HANDBOOK 2 (2010) (quot-
ing S. REP. No. 87-1881 (1962) (Conf. Rep.)).  The investment tax credit was amend-
ed in the mid-2000s, however, to include specific credits for taxpayers that invest in 
renewable energy.  See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 15801 (2012)); Tax Relief and Health Care Act 
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2911 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1 
(2012)).  In its present form, the investment tax credit is a corporate tax credit equal to 
thirty percent of the cost of certain eligible energy property placed in service prior to 
December 31, 2016.  I.R.C. § 48(a).  Among the types of energy property eligible for 
the thirty percent credit are solar energy property and qualified small wind energy 
property.  Id. at § 48(a)(2)(A).  “Qualified small wind energy property” means proper-
ty that generates electricity using turbines with nameplate capacity of no more than 
100 kilowatts.  Id. at § 48(c)(4).  Additionally, the investment tax credit was amended 
in response to the 2007–2008 credit crisis to permit taxpayers otherwise eligible for 
the production tax credit to make an irrevocable election to receive the investment tax 
credit in lieu of the production tax credit.  See id. at § 48(a)(5). 
 7. See I.R.C. § 48.  Tax credits can be understood as subsidies delivered via the 
tax system.  Like any tax credit, the renewable energy tax credits deliver economic 
value to taxpayers by offsetting their tax liability.  In other words, taxpayers can apply 
the credits against their tax bills to achieve dollar-for-dollar reductions to the amount 
of tax owed.  This is the economic equivalent of delivering a direct subsidy to a tax-
payer in the form of a check; the only difference is that instead of a check, the taxpay-
er receives a reduction in taxes owed.  For this reason, the renewable energy tax cred-
its can be understood as a spending program administered through the tax system. 
 8. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, H.R. 2029, § 301, 114th 
Cong. (2015).  For a discussion of tax extenders bills and their impact on tax policy, 
see generally Victor Fleischer, Commentary: Tax Extenders, 67 TAX L. REV. 613 
(2014). 
2
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The production tax credit was introduced as part of the Energy Policy 
Act of 1992,9 which marked the first time that Congress “acted affirmatively 
to address the issue of global climate change.”10  The credit provides a dollar-
for-dollar tax benefit to the owners of eligible renewable energy facilities, 
including certain wind farms, based on the amount of electricity produced 
and subsequently sold to unrelated persons.11  The amount of the credit avail-
able to wind projects for any taxable year is 2.3 cents per kilowatt-hour 
(“kWh”) of electricity generated:12 the amount of energy required to power a 
100-watt light bulb for ten hours.13  In 2010, 246 claimants claimed a total of 
$1.7 billion in production tax credits, an average of roughly $6.9 million per 
claimant.14  Eligible taxpayers can claim the credit during the first ten years 
after the renewable energy project began generating electricity.15 
Like most tax credits, the production tax credit is a nonrefundable credit 
that delivers economic value to taxpayers solely by offsetting their tax liabil-
ity.16  In other words, taxpayers can apply the credits to achieve dollar-for-
dollar reductions to their tax bills.17  In general, these tax credits are the eco-
nomic equivalent of delivering a direct subsidy to a taxpayer in the form of a 
check;18 however, because the taxpayer receives a reduction in taxes owed 
 
 9. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1212, 106 Stat. 2776 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 45 (West 2016)). 
 10. PHILIP SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PT. 103-91, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 1992, at 4551 (1994).  Concerns about climate change 
motivated many of the energy related provisions of the bill, including those address-
ing energy efficiency and renewable energy.  Id. 
 11. See I.R.C. § 45.  Prior to its expiration at the end of 2014, eligible energy 
facilities, which are referred to in the statute as “qualified facilities,” included certain 
wind energy facilities, biomass facilities and geothermal and hydropower facilities, 
among others.  See id. § 45(d). 
 12. See id. § 45(b)(2); Internal Revenue Notice 2014-36 (May 27, 2014).  This 
amount is inflation-adjusted to equal 1.5 cents per kWh in 1993 dollars. 
 13. So What is a Kilowatt-Hour?, DUKE ENERGY, http://www.duke-energy.com/
pdfs/MyHER%20What%20is%20a%20Killowatt-Hour%20Energy%20Chart.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
 14. MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43453, THE RENEWABLE 
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT: IN BRIEF 6, tbl. 3 (2014), http://nationalaglaw
center.org/wp-content/uploads//assets/crs/R43453.pdf. 
 15. § 45(a). 
 16. See SHERLOCK, supra note 14, at 1. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 
1155 (1988).  The production tax credit is an example of what is commonly called a 
“tax expenditure.”  Id.  As discussed in greater detail in Part IV.B.3 below, the con-
cept of tax expenditures, which was originally proposed by Stanley Surrey and has 
since been the subject of much debate, describes provisions in the tax code that do not 
impose taxes, but “are actually government spending programs disguised in tax lan-
guage.”  Id.; see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation: Carbon Tax, Health 
Care Tax, Bank Tax and Other Regulatory Taxes, 1 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1, 3 (2011) 
3
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instead of a check, the “subsidy” delivered via a nonrefundable credit is lim-
ited by the amount of taxes owed.  Nevertheless, because the production tax 
credit can be understood as a spending program administered through the tax 
system, this Article at times refers to the production tax credit as a subsidy for 
wind energy producers.  The production tax credit, which is subject to period-
ic sunset provisions, was allowed to expire at the end of 2014.19  Efforts to 
reinstate the credit were resisted by Republican lawmakers, who gained con-
trol of Congress in 2015, but the credit was ultimately extended along with 
several other expired tax provisions as part of a budget deal approved by 
Congress in December 2015.  Given the widespread concerns about climate 
change – not to mention energy independence – it is safe to assume that legis-
lators will continue to face questions about whether, and how, to encourage 
renewable energy production.  Continued government involvement in renew-
able energy, whether through direct regulation or through the tax system, 
should be expected.  Policymakers should revisit the traditional approach to 
incentivizing renewable energy through the production tax credit and seek 
ways to improve the credit. 
The purpose of this Article is to further our understanding of how the 
production tax credit works and does not work as a tax incentive to promote 
investment in renewable energy and to fight climate change.  For reasons to 
be discussed, the tax incentives traditionally available present a number of 
transaction costs and limitations that make them less effective than alternative 
incentives.  Specifically, this Article looks at the way the production tax cred-
it is employed in the context of wind farm development.  Because similar tax 
incentives and market conditions are relevant to other renewable energy in-
dustries, such as the solar energy industry, the wind industry was chosen as a 
representative case study within this context.20  Though the production tax 
 
[hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation] (“[T]he tax expenditure budget has 
been controversial from the beginning, with critics charging that it is impossible to 
define an objective, non-political baseline against which to measure tax expendi-
tures.”).  The concept rests, in part, on the observation that tax deductions and credits 
deliver an economic benefit to the taxpayer that is economically equivalent to a sub-
sidy. 
 19. The production tax credit was initially allowed to expire at the end of 2013, 
but it was retroactively reinstated via a tax extenders bill passed in late 2014.  See 
H.R. 5771, 113th Cong. § 155 (2014).  Both the production tax credit and the invest-
ment tax credit were extended by the Consolidated Appropriations Act in December 
2015 and are scheduled to gradually phase out over time.  See Consolidated Appro-
priations Act of 2016, H.R. 2029, § 301, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 20. See Allison Christians, Critical Issues in Comparative & International Taxa-
tion Case Study Research and International Tax Theory, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 331, 
351–52 (2010) (discussing representative case study methodology within tax scholar-
ship).  Note that the production tax credit has not been available to solar energy pro-
ducers since 2005, but the tax equity investment transactions discussed in this Article 
are also used to monetize investment tax credits in the context of solar energy deals.  
See § 45(d)(4); Cost of Capital: 2014 Outlook, PROJECT FIN. NEWSWIRE (Feb. 2014) 
[hereinafter 2014 Cost of Capital], http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/
4
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credit has been important for encouraging growth throughout the renewable 
energy industry, it has been especially important in the context of wind ener-
gy.21 
Wind farms, which use wind turbines to convert natural wind into me-
chanical energy and then electricity,22 have been “the fastest growing energy 
technology worldwide, achieving an annual growth rate of over 30%” in total 
installed capacity.23  Wind energy capacity, which is the amount of power 
that could be supplied if it were possible to run all wind turbines continuously 
at full-load, is measured in megawatts (“MW”).24  One megawatt is roughly 
the amount of energy produced by ten automobile engines, and one mega-
watt-hour is enough energy to power about 330 homes for one hour.25  From 
2009 to 2014, U.S. wind energy capacity grew from 25,000 MW to over 
61,000 MW.26  The amount of electricity generated from these turbines grew 
200% during that period, an increase the American Wind Energy Association 
attributes to “technological innovation and operational improvements, which 
[have] effectively driven down the costs and allowed development to occur in 
lower wind speed regions.”27 
Opponents to the production tax credit assert that the wind industry has 
matured to the point that continued subsidies are no longer justified.  Execu-
tives from traditional energy companies told Forbes magazine: “We believe 
the [production tax credit] has achieved its original purpose, namely shep-
herding a nascent industry to maturity, and any extension will cost taxpayers 
and electric consumers billions simply to benefit a handful of vested inter-
ests.”28  Conservative groups have opposed the renewable energy tax credits 




 21. See SHERLOCK, supra note 14, at Summary. 
 22. Wind 101: The Basics of Wind Energy, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N,  
http://www.awea.org/Resources/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=900&navItemNumber=5
87 (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
 23. Wind Energy, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/
energy/wind_energy.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
 24. What is a Megawatt and a Megawatt-Hour?, CLEAN ENERGY AUTHORITY, 
http://www.cleanenergyauthority.com/solar-energy-resources/what-is-a-megawatt-
and-a-megawatt-hour/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Wind Turbine Technology Played Key Role in Wind Energy’s Record-
Breaking Growth and Cost Decline, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N (Mar. 14, 2014), 
http://www.awea.org/MediaCenter/pressrelease.aspx?ItemNumber=6218 [hereinafter 
AWEA, Wind Turbine Technology]. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See, e.g., Anthony J. Alexander et al., Opinion, The PTC is No Longer Need-
ed to Support the Wind Industry, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/realspin/2014/10/23/the-ptc-is-no-longer-needed-to-support-the-wind-industry/. 
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ing that “forcing new-energy companies to weather market forces is the best 
way to test their viability and strengthen the wider energy field.”29 
There is truth to the view that subsidies can distort market activity; 
somewhat ironically, historical subsidies for fossil-fuel producers have con-
tributed to distortions in the energy sector that now disadvantage wind energy 
producers and drive the need for renewable energy subsidies.30  For example, 
the oil and gas industry has long had the benefit of tax-favored Master Lim-
ited Partnerships to help finance extraction activities.31  While some econo-
mists have proposed parity for renewable energy companies,32 others have 
advocated for ending all energy subsidies, for both traditional and renewable 
energy producers, based on faith in the free market and distaste for distortions 
caused by economic incentives.33  To the extent that energy subsidies distort 
the market, rather than respond to and correct existing market distortions, 
such proposals have merit. 
 
 29. John Tomasic, Koch-Backed Groups Move Fast Post-Election to Head Off 
Wind-Power Tax Credit, COLO. INDEP. (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.colorado
independent.com/150383/koch-backed-groups-move-fast-post-election-to-head-off-
wind-power-tax-credit. 
 30. Id.  See generally Uma Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barri-
ers to Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1679 (2012) (providing a survey of his-
torical regulations and subsidies and arguing that renewables are structurally disad-
vantaged due to these features). 
 31. Neil Auerbach, Founder and Managing Partner, Hudson Clean Energy Part-
ners, Keynote Address at the NYU School of Law Energy Finance Symposium: The 
Future of Clean Energy Finance (Feb. 15, 2013). 
 32. See, e.g., Master Limited Partnership Parity Act, S. 795, 113th Cong. § 2 
(2013). 
 33. See, e.g., Nicolas Loris, The Wind Production Tax Credit and the Case for 
Ending All Energy Subsidies, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 323, 324 (2013) (“Sub-
sidies are bad economic policy because they misallocate resources and reward politi-
cal connectedness as opposed to sound economic ideas.”).  But see Melissa Powers, 
Sustainable Energy Subsidies, 43 ENVTL. L. 211, 221 (2013).  Professor Powers ar-
gues that even if all economic distortions are ignored, the energy sector is not a free 
market: 
 
Since the early 1900s, most states have regulated electricity utilities as natural 
monopolies.  Under typical regulatory schemes, state Public Utility Commis-
sions (PUCs) regulate the types of investments utilities make, the rates they 
charge their consumers, the presumptive revenues those utilities may earn, and 
the resource mix they use to obtain power. . . .  In most [states that have re-
structured to expose utilities to some degree of competition], monopolies still 
provide retail power to consumers and must still choose the resource mix pur-
suant to least-cost or other cost-oriented mandates.  Electricity end-users rare-
ly get a choice regarding the types of power they receive.  While some retail 
customers do have choices of power suppliers--and have at times chosen to 
receive renewable power--these limited situations do not convert the electrici-
ty sector into a free market. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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However, the distortions in the energy sector exist apart from the histor-
ical fossil-fuel subsidies.  First, University of Kansas School of Law envi-
ronmental law professor Uma Outka has explained that “an implicit support 
structure for fossil energy is written into law in a range of areas, including 
environmental law, and . . . statutory and regulatory concessions to fossil 
energy inevitably distort how the costs of bringing new energy technologies 
to scale are perceived.”34  These historical features of the energy industry 
continue to present significant barriers to newer players like wind energy 
producers.  Second, and most importantly for this Article, traditional energy 
producers emit pollution, a negative externality that distorts prices in the en-
ergy industry to the detriment of clean energy producers.35 
The production tax credit is a subsidy intended to counter these distor-
tions in the energy sector by making wind energy projects more profitable. 36  
For this purpose, the production tax credit works very well.  The wind energy 
industry is highly sensitive to the availability of subsidies like the production 
tax credit, and observers have collected significant data that correlates slowed 
growth in the wind industry with periods of political uncertainty about the 
future availability of the credits.37  The expiration of the production tax credit 
at the end of 2013 was blamed for a decrease in the number of new wind pro-
jects and lost jobs related to the wind industry.38  This Article does not dis-
cuss whether the production tax credit delivers a meaningful economic bene-
fit to the wind industry.39  Rather, this Article seeks to contribute to the un-
derstanding of how the production tax credit works to promote a more effi-
cient energy market, and it proposes changes to the credit that would not only 
 
 34. Outka, supra note 30, at 1682. 
 35. See infra text accompanying notes 56–62. 
 36. Another commonly cited justification for subsidizing wind energy production 
is to help foster energy independence; however, the support for this justification has 
become weaker as domestic natural gas production has increased.  See David Schizer, 
Energy Tax Expenditures: Worthy Goals, Competing Priorities, and Flawed Institu-
tional Design 19–20 (Feb. 25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/David%20Schizer.pdf. 
 37. As discussed in Part III.A, because the production tax credit historically has 
been enacted for one- to three-year stretches and was subject to renewal at the end of 
each period.  Federal Production Tax Credit For Wind Energy, AM. WIND ENERGY 
ASS’N, http://www.awea.org/Advocacy/content.aspx?ItemNumber=797 (last visited 
July 8, 2015); see also Powers, supra note 33, at 222–23. 
 38. Lenny Bernstein, Wind Power Supporters Push Congress to Revive Expired 
Tax Credit, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/wind-power-supporters-push-congress-to-revive-expired-tax-
credit/2014/01/30/5c9c86da-89e6-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html. 
 39. See Joseph Cullen, Measuring the Environmental Benefits of Wind-
Generated Electricity, 5 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 107, 109 (2013), 
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~jcullen/Documents/measuringwind.pdf (last visited Feb. 
22, 2016) (“It is uncontroversial to assert that without federal and state subsidies, 
investment in new wind farms over the past decade would have been negligible.”). 
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make the production tax credit a more effective subsidy, but would also better 
align the credit with broader tax policy goals. 
Part II begins by exploring the theoretical justification for the produc-
tion tax credit as a Pigouvian subsidy intended to incentivize behaviors that 
produce positive externalities.  The presence and effect of negative externali-
ties in the energy sector are well documented, as pollution is a classic exam-
ple of a negative externality responsible for market failure.40  The positive 
externalities renewable energy companies generate when they displace tradi-
tional energy, however, are more nuanced.  Yet, this context is essential to 
understand the justifications for the production tax credit. 
This Article next describes the production tax credit in practice.  As has 
been noted by others, design features of the production tax credit have led to 
complex financing structures with high transaction costs.41  The most com-
mon tax equity investment structure requires wind developers to partner with 
passive investors who are willing and able to contribute capital in exchange 
for tax benefits.42  The pool of so-called “tax equity investors” is limited to 
roughly eleven to twenty cash-rich corporations outside the energy industry 
that include household names like Google, MetLife, Bank of America, J.P. 
Morgan, Wells Fargo, and Morgan Stanley.43  Anti-abuse provisions in the 
tax code operate to keep the pool of tax equity investors small, decreasing the 
availability of tax equity financing to wind developers.44 
Part III of the Article takes a closer look at the legal environment in 
which tax equity investment transactions take place and asks how legal uncer-
tainty may further discourage new entrants to the tax equity investment mar-
ket.  The first major area of legal uncertainty surrounding the production tax 
credit stems from sunset provisions that threaten the availability of the cred-
it.45  The sunset provisions have already received significant attention in aca-
demic literature and, therefore, are addressed only briefly in this Article.46  
The second potential source of uncertainty, which has received considerably 
less attention in academic literature, dates back to a 2012 court case over 
 
 40. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 41. See, e.g., Roberta F. Mann, Smart Incentives for the Smart Grid, 43 N.M. L. 
REV. 127, 141 (2013) (noting that “using tax incentives for renewable energy general-
ly requires complex transactions” because developers often do not have enough tax 
liability to benefit from the incentives); Kevin M. Walsh, Renewable Energy Finan-
cial Incentives: Focusing on Federal Tax Credits and the Section 1603 Cash Grant: 
Barriers to Development, 36 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 207, 235 (2013). 
 42. See infra Part II.B. 
 43. MICHAEL MENDELSOHN & JOHN HARPER, §1603 TREASURY GRANT 
EXPIRATION: INDUSTRY INSIGHT ON FINANCING AND MARKET IMPLICATIONS 11 
(2012), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/53720.pdf. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See infra Part III.A. 
 46. See, e.g., Powers, supra note 33, at 231; Walsh, supra note 41, at 235; 
Mitchell Ward, Note, The PTC and Wind Energy: Restructuring the Production Tax 
Credit as a More Effective Incentive, 11 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 455, 483–84 (2011). 
8
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rehabilitation tax credits.  In Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Commissioner, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied a tax equity investor 
the benefit of rehabilitation tax credits based on a substance-over-form analy-
sis that recast the tax equity partnership as a prohibited sale of the tax cred-
its.47 
The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) responded to the Historic Board-
walk case with agency guidance specific to rehabilitation tax credit transac-
tions.48  That guidance, which was watched closely by the renewable energy 
industry, differed in several respects from the safe harbor guidance on which 
wind energy tax equity investors have typically relied.49  Though the existing 
tax equity investment market continues to take comfort in the wind safe har-
bor, the recent legal uncertainty in broader tax equity investment markets 
highlights the fine line between legitimate tax equity financings and abusive 
transactions.  At least some potential investors have probably chosen to shy 
away from tax equity transactions in favor of more traditional deals.  Thus, 
this Article argues that continued reliance on costly tax equity investment 
transactions is bad for the wind industry because it depends upon a limited 
pool of capital that is unlikely to grow significantly.   
Here, this Article departs from existing scholarship by arguing that a 
subsidy that relies heavily on tax equity investment transactions reflects poor 
tax policy because the subsidy is poorly targeted to reach its intended recipi-
ents.  For this reason and others, this Part challenges the premise of recent 
commentators whose proposals would have considered how the production 
tax credit could be redesigned to help expand the supply of tax equity invest-
ment financing.50  Part IV shows that tax equity investment transactions mis-
direct part of the subsidy’s value away from wind projects through invest-
ment returns and advisor fees.  The analysis demonstrates that tax equity in-
vestment is more costly than traditional commercial financing that would be 
more readily available if the production tax credit were refundable.  This Part 
argues that a better proposal would eliminate the need for tax equity finance 
transactions by making the production tax credit refundable. 
The discussion below shows that a refundable production tax credit 
would constitute a more effective, better targeted subsidy than the nonrefund-
able version, largely because it would eliminate the need for tax equity fi-
nancing.  This proposal would not only improve the efficacy of the produc-
tion tax credit in practice, but it would also be consistent with broader tax 
policy goals such as efficiency and simplicity.  Accordingly, Part V con-
cludes that the production tax credit should be amended to make the credit 
refundable. 
 
 47. Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Comm’r, 694 F.3d 425, 462 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 48. See Rev. Proc. 2014-12, 2014-3 I.R.B. 415. 
 49. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 50. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 41, at 236–38 (advocating for a broadened pool 
of tax equity investors); Ward, supra note 46, at 480–82. 
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II.  THE WIND ENERGY PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 
A. The Wind Energy Production Tax Credit and Positive Externalities 
At the outset, the argument in favor of the production tax credit can be 
stated normatively in terms of the government’s obligation to protect its citi-
zens and their general welfare by promoting clean energy.  Specifically, the 
government should act to protect the populace from the dangers presented by 
climate change, including harms to health, property, and the country’s physi-
cal landscape.  Support for clean energy tends to fall along political party 
lines, however, and the ethical arguments in favor of subsidizing wind energy 
production often result in political gridlock.  Perhaps for this reason, modern 
tax scholarship has acknowledged that ethical arguments play a role in policy 
choices,51 but it has generally drawn more heavily from economic theory.52 
Economic theory is based on the premise that, in a perfectly efficient 
free market, the price of a good will equal its marginal cost.  Social welfare 
theorists further argue that at this price, supply and demand would reflect the 
socially optimal level of a good, which is the amount of the good required to 
maximize social wellbeing.53  Certain real-world problems can prevent mar-
 
 51. See, e.g., EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS, at XXIII 
(2015) (“[This book] focuses mostly on economic claims and arguments . . . .  But I 
do think it worthwhile to hold up our moral premises for examination from time to 
time”); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: 
A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1916–17 (1987) (“We 
focus on welfarist rather than entitlement theories, in part because we believe that 
such ethics, while not without problems, have more to commend them.”); Susan Pace 
Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 54 ALA. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2002) (“This Article applies the moral principles of Judeo-Christian ethics 
as a basis for urging the citizens of Alabama to insist that Alabama’s elected political 
leaders reform Alabama’s state tax structure, a critically important step towards en-
suring that Alabama’s children, especially children from low-income families, enjoy 
an opportunity to build a positive future.”); Ajay K. Mehrotra, “Render Unto Caesar . 
. .”: Religion/Ethics, Expertise, and the Historical Underpinnings of the Modern 
American Tax System, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 323 (2009) (“The aim of this essay is 
to probe further into the religious and ethical underpinnings of our modern tax sys-
tem.”). 
 52. See Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 523, 524 (2013) (observing that “just about every tax professor in 
the country introduces her students to the world of tax by articulating the goals of 
equity, administrability, and--you guessed it--efficiency”). 
 53. See J. R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 
706–07 (1939).  A social welfare approach to taxation seeks to maximize the welfare 
(or “utility”) enjoyed by individuals in society.  See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 
51, at 1916–17 (“[W]elfarist theories of distributive justice permit taxation either to 
finance public goods or to redistribute income, if the well-being of individuals in the 
society is thereby improved. . . .  Another virtue of welfarist theories is their con-
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kets from functioning efficiently, however.  As a result, the price may not 
equal the marginal cost, and the quantity of the good supplied may not be the 
socially optimal amount.54  In such instances, the market is said to be ineffi-
cient – or in a state of market failure – due to the oversupply or undersupply 
of a good.  One problem that can lead to market failure is the existence of 
externalities.55  Externalities describe costs, or benefits, that are not taken into 
account in the price of an item because consumers do not fully internalize that 
cost or benefit.56 
The classic example of a negative externality, described by British 
economist Arthur C. Pigou in the 1920s, is pollution.57  Pigou described a 
 
sistency with the Pareto principle: They view as desirable any change that makes 
some member of society better off without making any other member worse off.”).  In 
the context of individual income taxation, social welfare theories have been applied to 
analyze tax policy issues like progressive rate structures, commodity taxation and 
government expenditures on goods and services.  See, e.g., id. (applying a social wel-
fare theory to the analysis of progressive rates structures); Herwig J. Schlunk, Little 
Boxes: Can Optimal Commodity Tax Methodology Save the Debt-Equity Distinction?, 
80 TEX. L. REV. 859, 860 (2002) (applying an “optimal commodity tax methodology” 
that provides rules to structure commodity taxes in a way that maximizes social wel-
fare); LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 184–87 
(2008) (applying a social welfare theory to the analysis of government expenditures 
on goods and services). 
 54. See KAPLOW, supra note 54, at 184–87. 
 55. British economist Alfred Marshall, who referred to externalities as external 
economies and diseconomies, first articulated the theory of externalities in 1890.  
Agnar Sandmo, The Early History of Environmental Economics 17–18 (Norwegian 
Sch. of Econ., Dep’t of Econ. Discussion Paper No. 10/2014, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2432928.  The theory was further 
developed in the 1920s by British economist Arthur C. Pigou.  Id. at 19. 
 56. See id. at 19–20; see also Yoram Margalioth, Tax Policy Analysis of Climate 
Change, 64 TAX L. REV. 63, 63–64 (2010).  Note that in this Article, references to 
“externalities” refer to negative externalities unless the context indicates otherwise.  
See infra Part II.A (discussing positive externalities). 
 57. See Sandmo, supra note 55, at 19–20.  Though Pigou is well known for his 
contributions to the theory of externalities, he was not the first economist to observe 
that markets may be ill equipped to cope with environmental harms.  Id. at 3.  Econ-
omist Agnar Sandmo has traced the history of environmental economics at least as far 
back as Marquis de Condorcet, an eighteenth century economist who argued that it 
was unjust that the value of individuals’ properties be reduced by economic activities 
of others that harm the environment.  Id. at 4.  Nineteenth century economist John 
Stuart Mill argued that nature – “the earth itself, its forests and waters, and all other 
natural riches” – was a public good that could not be left to market forces and indi-
vidual action.  Id. at 9.  Both Condorcet and Mill qualified their conclusions that poli-
cy intervention as potentially appropriate to respond to environmental harms; howev-
er, Condorcet argued that “government interference should only take place when the 
harm to others could be clearly and convincingly documented,” and Mill argued that 
“it is not a sufficient argument for government intervention that the laissez-faire allo-
cation is imperfect; there must be reason to believe that government action, given its 
own imperfections, will actually improve the outcome.”  Id. at 4, 9. 
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factory emitting smoke that harms consumers, observing that the smoke “in-
flicts a heavy uncharged loss on the community, in injury to buildings and 
vegetables, expenses for washing clothes and cleaning rooms, expenses for 
the provision of extra artificial lights, and in many other ways.”58  In other 
words, pollution is a negative externality because the full cost of the pollution 
associated with the factory’s output is not included in the price of the goods it 
produces. 
In theory, when traditional energy producers engage in pollution-
causing activities without internalizing the social costs of pollution – the costs 
of which typically are passed on to purchasers – the price they charge con-
sumers will be artificially low, and the amount paid by consumers cannot 
adequately compensate for the harms inflicted on society.59  The artificially 
low price of traditional energy thus renders more appropriately priced com-
petitors, including clean energy companies like wind farms, unable to fully 
compete.60  This circumstance can result in an undersupply of the competing 
good, which in this case is wind energy. 
Stated more directly, the theory of negative externalities suggests that 
even if all regulatory distortions in the energy industry are ignored, the price 
of carbon emitting traditional energy sources is artificially low and leads to 
an oversupply of fossil fuels and a corresponding lack of demand for alterna-
tive sources of energy. 61  As a result, the wind industry will be unable to fully 
compete with traditional energy because demand for wind energy will always 
be suppressed relative to traditional energy due to the role of negative exter-
nalities in the energy industry. 
Existing law and policy literature in support of taxing traditional energy 
or subsidizing renewable energy has relied on the existence of these negative 
externalities as sufficient justification for policy intervention.62  Most aca-
demic observers have agreed that a well-designed corrective tax on the 
greenhouse gas carbon dioxide, which is a negative externality associated 
with fossil fuels, would be a more efficient and effective policy choice for 
 
 58. Id. at 19–20 (quoting ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 184 
(1920)). 
 59. Outka, supra note 30, at 1689. 
 60. Id. at 1702–03. 
 61. See id. at 1696–97. 
 62. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environ-
mental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 4, 7–8 (1991) 
(explaining that policy intervention to improve environmental quality rely on the 
theory that “private firms, if left unregulated, do not choose a ‘socially efficient’ level 
of environmental protection (pollution emission reduction)”); Margalioth, supra note 
56, at 63–64, 68 (calling the solution to negative externalities “obvious” and stating 
that “[i]individuals and firms need to be forced to internalize the cost; that is, face a 
private cost that is equal to the social cost”); Powers, supra note 33, 216–19 (discuss-
ing the negative externalities produced by traditional energy and concluding that “it is 
clear that [the external costs of fossil fuels] far exceed the externalized costs of re-
newable power sources”). 
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controlling emissions than tax subsidies.63  Nevertheless, tax subsidies for 
renewable energy have enjoyed more political support than the carbon tax.64  
A subsidy like the production tax credit does not force traditional energy pro-
ducers to internalize negative externalities in the same way that a carbon tax 
might,65 but it does have a related externalities-driven purpose.  The produc-
tion tax credit is properly understood as a Pigouvian subsidy to correct posi-
tive externalities. 
A Pigouvian subsidy on positive externalities, which is the complement 
of a Pigouvian tax on negative externalities,66 compensates producers for 
externalities that confer a benefit on society that is not reflected in the price.67  
At first blush, it seems reasonable enough to conclude that the production tax 
credit is justified because an increase in clean renewable energy from wind 
energy generation would have a corresponding beneficial decrease in harmful 
carbon emissions; however, it is worth considering the fact that, absent a sub-
stitution effect, renewable energy does not actively reduce pollution. 
The way that wind farms reduce greenhouse gases stands in stark con-
trast to more textbook examples of positive externalities.  Among the most 
traditional examples of positive externalities are research and development 
activities that benefit firms other than those that invest in the activities.68  A 
 
 63. Scott R. Milliman & Raymond Prince, Firm Incentives to Promote Techno-
logical Change in Pollution Control, 17 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 247, 260 (1989) 
(noting that the finding that emission subsidies are often inferior to emission taxes 
with respect to promoting abatement technological change was “broadly consistent 
with most previous literature”); Schizer, supra note 36, at 22. 
 64. Renewable energy subsidies like the production tax credit have also faced 
significant political opposition, as evidenced by the production tax credit sunset pro-
visions and its history of expired periods.  See infra Part III.A. 
 65. A tax on the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide, commonly referred to as a “car-
bon tax,” is a textbook example of a Pigouvian tax.  Jared Bernstein, Carbon Tax or 
Cap-and-Trade: Which Would Work Better?, WASH. POST (June 8, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/06/08/carbon-tax-or-cap-
and-trade-which-would-work-better/.  Pigouvian taxes are corrective taxes imposed 
on an activity that produces negative externalities.  Id.  University of San Diego Law 
School tax law professor Victor Fleischer explains: 
 
The idea is that by placing a small tax, equal to marginal social cost, on each 
unit of an activity to be discouragedenvironmental pollution is a common 
exampleprices will rise, forcing polluters to internalize the social cost of the 
harmful activity.  As a result, production will decrease, leading to an alloca-
tion of economic resources that reflects the true cost of the activity causing the 
pollution. 
 
Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigouvian Taxes 2–3 (San Diego Legal 
Studies, Paper No. 14-151, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2413066. 
 66. See Fleischer, supra note 65, at 6. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Klaus M. Schidt & Monika Schnitzer, Public Subsidies for Open 
Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market, 16 HARV. J.L. & 
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more interesting example, however, is found in beer breweries located along 
the James River in Richmond, Virginia.69  The breweries’ wastewater releas-
es carbon into the James, which helps remove dangerous nitrogen from the 
river, thereby improving water quality and saving the city money by reducing 
clean-up costs.70  In recognition of this clear positive externality, the city 
gave the breweries a break on their utility bills.71 
Wind farms differ from both the beer breweries and the classic example 
of research and development activities.  First, wind farms are different from 
the beer breweries because wind farms do not reduce existing carbon levels 
simply by operating.72  Second, unlike in the research and development con-
text, wind farm developers do not avoid investing in new wind projects due to 
fear that their returns will be diminished by competitors who will benefit 
from their investments.73  Rather, they avoid investing in new wind projects 
because wind farms cannot out-compete traditional energy producers, which 
can sell their energy at artificially low prices.74 
Rather, wind farms’ potential benefit to the environment – a social bene-
fit that should be considered an uncompensated positive externality – is real-
ized when wind energy displaces traditional energy (the “substitution effect”) 
and causes a corresponding offset to carbon emissions.  Washington Univer-
sity in St. Louis economist Joseph Cullen developed an economic model to 
estimate the environmental contribution of wind power resulting from this 
 
TECH. 473, 480 (2003).  Competing firms may take advantage of a new technology 
without incurring the costs to develop that technology.  Id.  The firm that developed 
the technology, therefore, is comparatively disadvantaged because, unlike its competi-
tors, it had to assume risk and invest significant money to develop the same technolo-
gy that its competitors are now enjoying for free.  Id.  As a result, firms are discour-
aged from investing in research and development activities because they do not enjoy 
the sole benefit of their investment.  Id. at 492.  In this example, technological inno-
vation is a positive externality that leads to under-investment in research and devel-
opment.  See id.  Policy interventions, including subsidies, are intended to correct this 
market failure by enabling firms that invest in research and development activities to 
earn a profit that makes research and development activities economically attractive.  
Id. at 485. 
 69. Michael Martz, New Brewery to Bring Pollution-Reducing Benefits to James 






 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Jeff McMahon, Wind Power May Not Reduce Emissions As Expected: Ar-
gonne, FORBES (May 30, 2012, 2:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/
2012/05/30/wind-power-may-not-reduce-carbon-emissions-argonne/#5e4458e6574c. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See supra Part II.A. 
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substitution effect.75  Cullen’s study of a large electricity grid in Texas con-
firmed that wind power subsidies do result in displacement of fossil fuel en-
ergy, but it also showed that the effect of this substitution effect on mitigation 
of emissions varies greatly depending on the type of generator displaced.76  
Cullen’s results, though based on a discrete case study, highlight the fact that 
the distribution of positive externalities across wind energy producers would 
be hard to assess: “When low marginal cost wind-generated electricity enters 
the grid, higher marginal cost fossil fuel generators will reduce their output.  
However, emission rates of fossil fuel generators vary greatly by generator.  
Thus, the quantity of emissions offset by wind power will depend crucially on 
which generators reduce their output.”77 
An efficient production tax credit would subsidize wind farm develop-
ment so that the market price for wind energy would reflect its full social 
value, which is the private value of wind energy to consumers plus the value 
of offset carbon emissions.78 
A production tax credit that achieves this result would be considered op-
timal.79  In reality, however, policymakers are limited in their ability to set 
the production tax credit to the correct level to restore market efficiency.  
First, the government would have to know the correct amount of wind devel-
opment that would result in the optimal amount of carbon reduction, which 
may be impossible, especially in light of Cullen’s observations.80  Second, the 
government would have to know the economic value of carbon reduction, 
which may also be impossible.81 
 
 75. Cullen, supra note 39, at 107. 
 76. See id.  
 77. Id. at 107–08.  In Cullen’s study, wind power accounted for approximately 
two percent of wind power production in 2005–2007, but the emissions offset by 
wind were significantly less than two percent due to the types of traditional energy 
actually displaced.  Id. at 122. 
 78. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Carbon Tax, Health Care Tax, Bank Tax, 
and Other Regulatory Taxes, in DAVID A. BRENNEN ET AL., BEYOND ECONOMIC 
EFFICIENCY IN UNITED STATES TAX LAW 187 (2013) (“[T]axation is not just an ac-
ceptable vehicle for regulation, but also the regulatory technique that is preferred by 
most commentators (even though it may be less realistic politically).”); Louis Kaplow 
& Stephen Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2002) (arguing that the traditional consensus among econ-
omists that corrective taxes are superior to quantity regulation is still valid and stating 
that “corrective taxes (and modified permit schemes) possess the same basic ad-
vantage over quantity regulation . . . making possible a result in which the level of the 
externality is optimal (or more nearly so)”). 
 79. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 78, at 2. 
 80. NOLAN MILLER, NOTES ON MICROECONOMIC THEORY 219 (2006), 
https://business.illinois.edu/nmiller/documents/notes/notes8.pdf. 
 81. Carbon Taxes: Reducing Economic Growth—Achieving No Environmental 
Improvement, INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH, http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/
studies/carbon-tax-primer/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
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Even without knowing the optimal size of the subsidy, however, it is 
reasonable to conclude that if the full subsidy does not reach its intended re-
cipients, then the tax will not be as effective as it would be otherwise.  As the 
next Part shows, in practice, certain features of the production tax credit have 
hindered the delivery of the subsidy and led to the widespread use of transac-
tions that drive the subsidy away from wind farms.  These transactions misdi-
rect part of the subsidy away from wind developers, resulting in a poorly 
targeted subsidy that is less effective than it could be if it were amended to be 
a refundable credit. 
B.  The Wind Energy Production Tax Credit in Practice: An Ineffective 
Subsidy 
1.  Restrictions on Wind Developers’ Ability to Use the Wind Energy 
Production Tax Credit 
The production tax credit is available to eligible wind energy companies 
during their first ten years of generating electricity.82  This timing has a sig-
nificant consequence: because the production tax credit is not available until a 
wind farm begins generating energy,83 wind projects in the development 
phase cannot earn the credit because they are not yet producing energy.84 
Tying the subsidy amount to actual wind energy generation makes sense if 
the goal is to encourage greater quantities of wind energy production in order 
to displace traditional energy; this benefit is undermined, however, to the 
extent that wind projects require significant financing during the earlier de-
velopment stages before the credit is available.85  In fact, capital expenditures 
on turbines account for approximately eighty percent of development costs 
 
 82. I.R.C. § 45(a) (West 2016).  The credit was equal to 2.3 cents per kilowatt-
hour (kWh) of energy produced by qualified energy resources at qualified facilities 
and sold to an unrelated person during the taxable year.  Id. § 45; Renewable Electric-
ity Production Tax Credit, DATABASE ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & 
EFFICIENCY (Dec. 31, 2016), http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/734. 
 83. § 45(a). 
 84. PTC-eligible taxpayers can, however, elect to instead claim the investment 
tax credit.  See id. § 48(a)(5)(C)(i).  The investment tax credit is generally equal to 
thirty percent of expenditures on turbine equipment.  Id. § 48(a)(5)(A). 
 85. Note that wind developers could alternatively choose to use the investment 
tax credit.  See sources cited supra note 6.  However, wind developers face similar 
barriers to use of the investment tax credit as they do with the production tax credit, 
including both the need to finance the project prior to receiving the subsidy and lim-
ited ability to use the credit due to lack of tax liability.  See EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY 
ASS’N, 2 WIND ENERGY – THE FACTS, COSTS AND PRICES 3, http://www.ewea.org/
fileadmin/ewea_documents/documents/publications/WETF/Facts_Volume_2.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss2/7
2016] IMPROVING TAX INCENTIVES 469 
for new wind farms,86 and many wind projects need subsidized financing 
during that stage. 
Two additional features of the production tax credit significantly affect 
the way the credit is used in practice.  First, like all tax credits, the production 
tax credit can only be claimed by a taxable entity, which means only corpora-
tions or individuals can use the credit.87  The partnerships and limited liability 
companies (“LLCs”) that typically own eligible wind projects – and earn the 
credits – are not eligible to claim the credits at the operating company level 
because these forms of business organizations are pass-through entities under 
the existing tax system.88  In addition, as discussed below, individuals are 
limited in their ability to use the production tax credit due to certain anti-
abuse rules in the tax code.89  Second, the production tax credit is not refund-
able, which means only taxpayers with projected tax liabilities can use the 
credit.90  Because a credit is a dollar-for-dollar offset against taxes otherwise 
due, if a taxpayer has no tax liability, then the credit will have limited value 
to that taxpayer.  Wind developers typically have no tax liability in the early 
years because their expenses far outpace revenues, and as a result, the credit 
has no immediate value to them.91 
Because of these limitations, the wind industry has implemented com-
plex financing structures designed to monetize the production tax credit to 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Partnerships are not subject to entity-level taxation.  § 701.  Non-corporate 
domestic entities that do not elect to be treated as corporations will be treated as a 
partnership (if it has two or more members) or a disregarded entity (if it has a single 
owner), in either case not subject to federal income taxation.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
3(a)–(b) (2015) (setting for the “check-the-box” regulations). 
 88. Unless it elects to be taxed as a corporation, an LLC will be taxed either as a 
partnership or a disregarded entity depending on the number of members.  I.R.C. § 
701.  As a practical matter, entities rarely “check the box” to be taxed as a corporation 
because, unlike partnerships, corporations are subject to two levels of income tax. See 
id. § 11 (first-level tax on corporate income); id. § 301 (second-level tax on corporate 
distributions). 
 89. See infra notes 171–78 and accompanying text. 
 90. Tax credits are dollar-for-dollar offsets against the amount of taxes a taxpay-
er would otherwise owe.  Refundable vs. Non-Refundable Tax Credits, IRS, 
https://www.irs.com/articles/refundable-vs-non-refundable-tax-credits (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2016).  In other words, a taxpayer’s tax liability is first determined without 
taking credits into account, and then any available credits are applied to reduce the 
total amount owed.  Id.  A nonrefundable credit can reduce the taxpayer’s tax liability 
to zero but no further.  Id.  In contrast, a refundable tax credit (like the earned income 
tax credit) can reduce a taxpayer’s tax liability below zero so that the government will 
owe the taxpayer money in the form of a tax refund.  Id. 
 91. See Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policy for A Cleaner, 
More Democratic Energy Future, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 303, 308–09 (2014) (“Renewa-
ble energy projects can take ten or more years before they recover their high up-front 
capital expenditures and begin to generate taxable profits.”). 
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help fund wind developers’ initial investments in wind projects.92  The most 
straightforward of these structures is to finance the wind project through a 
“flip partnership.”  Before describing the flip partnership structure, however, 
it is instructive to understand the general structure of wind project financing 
The simplest financing structure for new wind projects is an all-equity 
structure pursuant to which a wind developer contributes all needed capital.93  
The developer wholly owns the project without any supplemental debt fi-
nancing, and all project risks and returns, including any tax benefits, inure to 
the developer.94  This all-equity structure is most readily available to a small 
number of cash-rich developers with the ability to use the tax credits.95 
The most prominent example of a developer that has used the all-equity 
structure is FPL Energy.96  At the close of 2013, FPL Energy was the largest 
wind power company in North America and the owner of roughly seventeen 
percent of wind power capacity in the United States and Canada.97  In con-
trast, smaller wind energy developers are not well positioned to use the all-
equity structure, particularly if they need the production tax credit to subsi-
dize the transaction.  Historically, developers who lacked the ability to use 
the credits were forced to sell the project after the construction phase to a 
larger company with capacity to use the credits.98  In the absence of advanced 
financing structures designed to monetize the tax credits, a Berkeley Lab 
report explains: 
[U]p until about 2003, one of the few options available to such devel-
opers was to develop a project up to the point of construction and then 
sell it to a larger entity (e.g., FPL Energy) with not only access to the 
capital required to build the project, but also a tax base large enough 
to efficiently use the project’s Tax Benefits.99 
 
 92. See generally Mark Bolinger et al., A Review of Wind Project Financing 
Structures in the USA, 12 WIND ENERGY 3 (2009), http://www.osti.gov/scitech/
servlets/purl/962718; JOHN P. HARPER ET AL., WIND PROJECT FINANCING 
STRUCTURES: A REVIEW & COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 3 (Sept. 2007), 
https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/REPORT%20lbnl%20-%2063434.pdf (providing an 
overview of common tax equity investment structures used to monetize renewable 
energy tax credits). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 3. 
 95. Id. at 4. 
 96. Id.  FPL Energy is now a subsidiary of NextEra Energy Resource.  Company 
Profile, FLA. POWER & LIGHT CO., https://www.fpl.com/about/company-profile.html 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2016). 
 97. ANNUAL REPORT, NEXTERA ENERGY 4 (2013), http://www.investor.nextera
energy.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=88486&p=irol-reportsCorporate (click “2013 Annual 
Report” to download .pdf file of the report). 
 98. Bolinger et al., supra note 92, at 2. 
 99. Id. 
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Over the past decade, market growth in the wind industry has demanded in-
creasing amounts of capital to sustain growth and more elaborate financing 
structures have evolved to meet this need.100 
To the extent that a wind developer is able to access debt financing, a 
wind developer may also choose to incorporate borrowing through the use of 
project finance structures.  In the most basic project finance structure, a wind 
developer would form a new, wholly-owned subsidiary that directly owns the 
wind project.101  This new subsidiary, called the “Project Company,” is a 
pass-through entity like a limited liability company (“LLC”), which means 
the Project Company is not a taxable entity.102  Instead, all taxes incurred at 
the Project Company level, as well as tax benefits earned, pass through to its 
owner, the wind developer, who then reports such taxes on its own tax re-
turn.103 
In order to finance the project, the wind developer would cause the Pro-
ject Company to borrow a limited recourse construction loan from project 
finance lenders.104  The project finance lenders would secure the loan by tak-
ing as collateral all the project assets – for instance, the turbines or power 
purchase agreements – and all future cash flow of the Project Company.105  
After the wind farm is built and begins operating, the construction loan will 
convert to a term loan, and the Project Company will begin repaying the pro-
ject finance lenders.106  Any profits left over after the debt payments will 
belong to the wind developer.107 
If the size of the project finance loan is insufficient to fund develop-
ment, or if the developer does not anticipate sufficient returns on the invest-
ment, then the wind project will not be built.  One purpose of the production 
tax credit is to encourage wind farm development by responding to these 
challenges.108  Unfortunately, however, under this financing structure, the 
production tax credit cannot adequately respond to either concern. 
Insofar as a wind developer’s decision about whether to proceed with a 
new wind project turns on its ability to access sufficient debt financing, the 
 
 100. See id. at 6. 
 101. Id. at 3–4. 
 102. Id. at 4. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Traditionally, project finance loans are nonrecourse loans.  SCOTT L. 
HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE 322 (3d ed. 
2008).  A nonrecourse loan is a secured loan with respect to which the borrower has 
no liability beyond the value of the security granted as collateral.  See id.  The creditor 
bears the risk that the value of the collateral may be insufficient to cover the outstand-
ing amount of the loan in the event of default; the creditor has no further recourse 
against the borrower.  See id.  In practice, purely nonrecourse project finance loans 
have become rare.  See id. 
 105. Bolinger et al., supra note 92, at 31. 
 106. See id. at 18. 
 107. Id. at 21. 
 108. Id. at 2. 
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production tax credit does not immediately solve this problem.  First, the 
lenders cannot take the tax credits as collateral because, as non-equity hold-
ers, the lenders are ineligible to claim the tax credits directly.109  Second, the 
lenders’ lien on the Project Company’s cash flows will not reach the value of 
the tax credit because the credit will never generate any cash flow at that level 
because the Project Company is not a taxable entity.110  For these reasons, the 
anticipated tax credits are unavailable as additional collateral to support a 
larger loan at the Project Company level.111  The wind developer similarly 
cannot use anticipated cash flows from the production tax credit as collateral 
for loans at the developer level if the developer lacks the tax liability neces-
sary to use the credit.112  The wind developer’s ability to build a new wind 
farm, therefore, continues to be limited by the size of the loan it is able to 
secure through traditional project financing, an amount that ignores the poten-
tial value of the tax credit. 
The production tax credit is similarly limited, under traditional financing 
structures, to encourage investment by increasing the wind developer’s ex-
pected rate of return on its investment.113  The credits that will be earned by 
the Project Company after it begins generating energy are only valuable inso-
 
 109. See I.R.C. § 45(d)(1) (West 2016) (emphasis added) (defining “qualified 
facility” in the context of wind facilities as “any facility owned by the taxpayer” and 
placed in service by the statutory deadlines).  This restriction is in contrast to treat-
ment of anticipated cash flows from a direct subsidy, which could be granted as addi-
tional collateral.  See id.  In 2009–2011, wind developers could elect to receive a 
direct subsidy called a “cash grant” in lieu of the tax credits.  See American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1603, 123 Stat. 306, 364–66.  
In theory the cash flows generated by the cash grant could more readily be used as 
loan collateral; however, in practice many lenders were reluctant to accept the cash 
grant as security due to perceived risk that the government may recapture the cash 
grant money in the event of a foreclosure.  See Keith Martin et al., Wind Industry Gets 





 110. The credit is similarly unlikely to produce cash flows at the wind developer 
level because most wind developers lack sufficient tax liability to absorb the nonre-
fundable credit.  See Bolinger et al., supra note 92, at 2 (“Historically, most wind 
project developers have been small, single-purpose entities without a tax base of suf-
ficient size to make efficient use of the Tax Benefits generated by a wind project.”). 
 111. If the lenders expected that the tax credits would eventually be monetized at 
the wind developer level, then they may be willing to negotiate a separate agreement 
pursuant to which the wind developer would contribute to the Project Company cash 
generated by the credits; however, in most cases the wind developer will never be 
able to use the credits in order to monetize the value, so as a practical matter this 
option is unavailable. 
 112. See Bolinger et al., supra note 92, at 31. 
 113. See id. at vi. 
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far as the owners expect to receive economic benefit from those tax credits.114  
If the wind developer does not expect to be able to use the credits until a date 
in the distant future, then the credits may not increase its expected rate of 
return enough to make a particular wind project viable.115  If the credits could 
be used to increase the amount of available project financing, then the wind 
developer may be able to increase its rate of return by adding additional lev-
erage at the Project Company level; for the reasons explained above, howev-
er, the production tax credit cannot be used for this purpose. 
The limitations described in this Part place meaningful restrictions on 
wind developers’ ability to use the production tax credit and decrease its ef-
fectiveness as a subsidy to wind energy companies.  As is explained in the 
next Part, this problem has given rise to complex, costly tax equity financing 
structures used to monetize the tax credits.  Unfortunately, such structures are 
an imperfect solution because they misdirect part of the subsidy’s value away 
from wind projects. 
2.  Monetizing the Wind Energy Production Tax Credit Through Tax 
Equity Investment 
Due to the constraints on its use, the production tax credit does not im-
mediately respond to the wind developer’s barriers to investment.  The wind 
developer will either forgo the wind project entirely to pursue other projects 
with greater expected returns, or it will limit the size of the project to a level 
that can be financed solely with a combination of equity and project financ-
ing.  In either case, the production tax credit will fail to incentivize the devel-
opment of wind projects unless wind developers are able to monetize the tax 
credits.  To solve this problem, complex financing structures have been de-
signed to make the production tax credit valuable to wind developers who are 
otherwise unable to use the tax credits.  The most straightforward of these 
structures is the flip partnership structure. 
In a flip partnership, the wind developer partners with a third party, 
called a “tax equity investor,” that has the ability to use the production tax 
credit.116  When this structure was first introduced, the tax equity investors 
were often strategic investors with knowledge of and interest in owning and 
operating wind projects.117  This has become less common over time, and 
today, institutional investors without expertise in wind energy development 
are the more typical tax equity investors.118 
 
 114. Id. at i. 
 115. See Mormann, supra note 91, at 308–09 (“Without current tax liability from 
other sources, project developers could carry forward their tax incentives for future 
use but the lost time value would impose a significant discount.”). 
 116. See Bolinger et al., supra note 92, at 7. 
 117. See id. at 5. 
 118. See id. at 7. 
21
Layser: Improving Tax Incentives for Wind
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
474 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Institutional investors have special knowledge in tax reduction strategies 
and seek investments like wind projects that will allow them to offset tax 
liabilities attributable to other sources of income.119  Practically speaking, the 
tax equity investor is always a cash-rich corporate entity.  In fact, the market 
of tax equity investors has generally been limited to a group of roughly elev-
en to twenty investment banks and, more recently, a handful of public com-
panies that have made tax equity investment a routine part of their tax reduc-
tion strategy.120  The field of tax equity investors includes, among others: 
Google, MetLife, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan, Wells Fargo, and Morgan 
Stanley.121 
Once a tax equity investor has been selected, the wind developer and the 
tax equity investor partner to own the Project Company.122  Depending on 
how the transaction is structured, the tax equity investor will either contribute 
cash to the Project Company in exchange for a passive equity interest in the 
project entity, which is typically an LLC, or the investor will purchase a share 
of the developer’s membership interests.123  As discussed below, the tax equi-
ty investor will negotiate a target internal rate of return (“IRR”) and will size 
the initial investment based on that target IRR.124  The IRR is calculated by 
setting the initial investment as a negative value – cash outflow – and adding 
the present value of expected future cash flows until the number becomes 
positive and the required return is reached.125  The relevant future cash flows 
may include not only the production tax credits the tax equity investor will 
receive, but also cash it will receive – either from operating income or from a 
future sale of the equity interest upon exit – its anticipated cash savings from 
depreciation, and interest deductions.126 
The relationship between the tax equity investor and the wind developer 
is documented in the project company’s operating agreement, which de-
 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. at 8. 
 121. See MENDELSOHN & HARPER, supra note 43, at 11; Bolinger et al., supra 
note 92, at 7. 
 122. See Bolinger et al., supra note 92, at 18. 
 123. For a discussion of the tax consequences of choosing to structure the initial 
investment by the tax equity investor as a contribution to the partnership or as a pur-
chase and sale transaction, see Dennis Mortiz, Modeling Choices Impact Tax Equity 
Financing, N. AM. WIND POWER (Mar. 2008), http://www.advantageforanalysts.com/
documents/20080301NAWModelingChoices.pdf. 
 124. See Wales Mack & John Marciano, Modeling Investments in Tax Equity 
Partnerships: Solving the Puzzle in a Post-Treasury Grant World, BLOOMBERG BNA: 




 125. Id. at 6. 
 126. Keith Martin, Calculating How Much Tax Equity Can Be Raised, PROJECT 
FIN. NEWSWIRE 18–26 (June 2008), http://www.chadbourne.com/CalculatingHow
MuchTaxEquity_Jun08_project_finance/. 
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scribes the rights and obligations of the members.127  Because operating 
agreements are not public records, tax equity investment documentation is not 
typically available for review by researchers.128  A search of the U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission through the Edgar database yielded just one 
example of a wind energy tax equity investment operating agreement: J.P. 
Morgan’s investment in the Kaheawa Wind Power I project developed by 
First Wind Holdings, Inc. (“First Wind”) in Hawaii.129 
First Wind had formed a limited liability company named UPC Hawaii 
Wind Partners, LLC (“UPC Hawaii”), which indirectly owned the project 
company, Kaheawa Wind Power, LLC.130  The project company operated a 
30 MW wind farm on the island of Maui in Hawaii, which had already 
reached commercial operation.131  This wind project was called the “Kaheawa 
project.”132  The Kaheawa project was financed using a flip partnership tax 
equity investment structure and is, therefore, a useful example for the purpose 
of this Article.133  The extent to which the transaction is representative in the 
market, however, can be assessed only based on anecdotal descriptions of 
typical transactions, as described by practitioners and other commentators. 
In its public filings, First Wind explained its use of tax equity invest-
ment as follows: 
In these transactions, we receive up-front payments, and our tax 
equity investors receive most of the operating cash flow and sub-
stantially all of the PTCs and taxable income or loss generated by 
the project until they achieve their targeted investment returns and 
return of capital, which we typically expect to occur in ten years.  
As a result, a tax equity financing substantially reduces the cash 
distributions from the applicable project available to us for other 
uses.  Also, the period during which the tax equity investors re-
ceive most of the cash distributions from electricity sales and re-
 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Angela Schneeman, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 233 (6th ed. 2012). 
 129. UPC Haw. Wind Partners II, LLC, Amended & Restated Limited Liability 
Company Agreement (Aug. 16, 2007) [hereinafter UPC Haw. LLC Agreement], 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1434804/000104746910008574/a2200305ze
x-10_28.htm. 
 130. See id. at 1. 
 131. Id. 
 132. First Wind Holdings Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 2, 112 (May 14, 
2010) (“[Kaheawa Wind Power I] qualified for and receives PTCs and MACRS de-
preciation, along with cash payments under its PPA, and is currently financed with a 
tax equity investment from JP Morgan.”) [hereinafter First Wind Holdings Registra-
tion], http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1434804/000104746910005272/
a2195887zs-1a.htm. 
 133. UPC Haw. LLC Agreement at 34. 
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lated hedging activities may last longer than expected if our wind 
energy projects perform below our expectations.134  
To consummate the tax equity investment transaction, First Wind 
caused UPC Hawaii to divide the membership interests of UPC Hawaii Wind 
Partners II (“the Company”) into Class A and Class B membership interests 
and sold all of the Class B membership interests to J.P. Morgan.135  The 
Company directly owned the project company.136  A tax equity investment 
transaction may follow this model, in which a developer and tax equity inves-
tor become co-owners of an entity that owns a project company, or the parties 
could partner to own the project company directly. 
Like most tax equity investment transactions, the Class B membership 
interests purchased by J.P. Morgan were primarily passive membership inter-
ests that gave J.P. Morgan little control over the operations of the project 
company.137  The management of the Company was governed by a separate 
Management Services Agreement (“MSA”) between UPC Hawaii and an 
affiliate (“the Manager”), which was incorporated by reference in the tax 
equity investment operating agreement.138  The performance of the Manager 
under the MSA was to be supervised by the managing member of the Com-
pany, which under the operating agreement, was UPC Hawaii.139 
Further, under the operating agreement, no member other than the man-
aging member had “any right, power or authority to take part in the manage-
ment or control of the business of, or transact any business for, the Company, 
to sign for or on behalf of the Company or to bind the Company in any 
way.”140  J.P. Morgan, as the Class B member, further agreed not to exercise 
any authority otherwise available to it under the Delaware Limited Liability 
Company Act to bind or commit the Company to agreements or transactions, 
or to hold itself out as an agent of the Company.141 
Finally, the day-to-day operations and management of the project com-
pany itself were governed by two operation and maintenance agreements 
between the project company and General Electric International, Inc. and 
UPC Wind O&M, LLC – another affiliate of the developer – respectively.142  
J.P. Morgan’s membership interest did carry voting rights, particularly with 
respect to certain “major decisions,” such as sales of the Company; however, 
as a practical matter, its membership interest conferred very little ability to 
 
 134. First Wind Holdings Registration, supra note 132, at 4. 
 135. UPC Haw. LLC Agreement, supra note 129, at 1. 
 136. Id. at 10. 
 137. See generally id. 
 138. Id. at 25. 
 139. Id. at 26. 
 140. Id. at 6. 
 141. Id. at 25. 
 142. See id. at 26 (Section 8.2(b) referring to the O&M Agreement, which is de-
fined as the agreement between the Operator and the Project Company, where the 
Operator is defined by reference to two separate O&M agreements). 
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control or manage the day-to-day activities of either the Company or the wind 
project owned by the Company.  J.P. Morgan’s passive interest in the wind 
project is typical of tax equity investments. 
In the prototypical example of a tax equity investment transaction, the 
partnership will allocate up to ninety-nine percent of its taxable income or 
loss and ninety-nine percent of the production tax credit earned by the project 
company to the tax equity investor during the period when the project com-
pany will be eligible for the credit.143  The remaining one percent of the in-
come, loss, and credits are allocated to the wind developer.144  Any cash dis-
tributions, however, are made first to the wind developer until it receives a 
return on its equity investment, and then to the tax equity investor.145  Despite 
the income and loss allocation, the tax equity investor would not expect to 
receive much pre-tax return on its investment; almost all of the economic 
return on tax equity investment is attributable to the value of the tax cred-












 143. Memorandum from Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP to Clients & 
Friends, Investment in Alternative Energy After the End of Cash Grants, at 2 (Sept. 6, 
2011), http://www.cadwalader.com/uploads/cfmemos/4d165fda9e1fbb1ff75bd07e225
c88a8.pdf [hereinafter Cadwalader, Investment in Alternative Energy]. 
 144. Id.  The primary reason for the 99/1 percent allocations is to ensure that the 
deal structure remain within the IRS safe harbor set forth in Revenue Procedure 2007-
65.  See Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-2 C.B. 967; infra Part III.B.  These allocations may 
or may not be proportional to the amount of equity contributed by the parties, howev-
er.  See Bolinger et al., supra note 92, at 7.  A strategic investor may be willing to 
contribute nearly all the capital required to finance the project, while the wind devel-
oper contributes very little.  See id. at 5.  Institutional investors, however, will con-
tribute much less to the project and require the wind developer to contribute a large 
amount of equity to the project, which it may choose to do either with or without 
borrowing at the wind developer level.  See id. at 5–9. 
 145. Cadwalader, Investment in Alternative Energy, supra note 143, at 2. 
 146. Compare Martin, supra note 109 (explaining that, as of 2008, most investors 
require a pre-tax return of two percent), with Dipa Sharif et al., The Return – and 
Returns – of Tax Equity for U.S. Renewable Projects, BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. 
4 (Nov. 21, 2011), www.bnef.com/WhitePapers/download/54 (reporting that after-tax 
yields on tax equity investments grew to nine percent in 2008). 
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This prototypical example adheres closely to an IRS safe harbor issued 
on November 5, 2007.147 As discussed in Part III.B.1 below, the safe harbor 
assures taxpayers that the IRS will not challenge tax equity investment trans-
actions as lacking substantial economic effect as long as the parties meet cer-
tain guidelines set forth by the IRS.  Among the guidelines is the requirement 
that the developer maintain at minimum a one percent in each material item 
of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit at all times during the 
existence of the project company.148 
As explained in Part IV.A below, the ninety-nine percent/one percent 
restriction imposed by the safe harbor guidelines limits the amount of financ-
ing available to the wind developer by reducing the amount of anticipated 
future cash flow from the production tax credit.  In other words, due to this 
restriction, one percent of the production tax credit cannot be monetized 
through tax equity investment.  The First Wind deal, however, was completed 
in August 2007, prior to the issuance of the IRS safe harbor.149  Under the 
First Wind agreement, a full 100% of all items of the Company’s income and 
loss, gain, deductions, and credits were to be allocated to J.P. Morgan during 
this initial period.150  In this respect, the First Wind deal is no longer repre-
sentative of a typical tax equity investment transaction because it is unlikely 
that many parties today would risk violating the IRS safe harbor.151  Never-
theless, the First Wind deal remains an interesting example of how taxpayers 
may behave in the absence of the IRS safe harbor: the parties structured the 
deal so as to monetize the entire value of the production tax credit. 
Importantly, these initial allocations generally do not reflect the propor-
tionate economic investments of the parties.  A tax equity investor is unlikely 
to contribute ninety-nine percent of the capital needed to finance a wind pro-
ject, at least in part because tax equity investors do not intend to engage in the 
business of operating a wind farm or intend to tie their potential rate of return 
to the wind farm’s general success as a business.152  Rather, assuming a tax 
equity investor expects to receive all of the tax benefits of the project compa-
ny, including depreciation and interest deductions in addition to tax credits, 
the tax equity investor may be willing to contribute up to sixty percent of 
capital.153  This amount is far below the ninety-nine percent interest in tax 
attributes tax equity investors typically claim during the early years. 
Though the actual amount of production tax benefits and other cash 
flows generated may differ from the amount anticipated by the parties’ early 
models, the First Wind deal demonstrates how the parties may negotiate 
 
 147. Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 C.B. 967. 
 148. Id. at § 4.02. 
 149. UPC Haw. LLC Agreement, supra note 129, at 1. 
 150. Id. at 14. 
 151. Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 C.B. 967. 
 152. See Chris Groobey et al., Project Finance Primer for Renewable Energy and 
Clean Tech Projects, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (Aug. 2010), 
https://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/ctp_guide.pdf. 
 153. See id. 
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terms that help ensure that the tax equity investor will receive its negotiated 
rate of return.  Rather than defining the initial period by reference to the years 
when the production tax credit or other tax items would be available, the op-
erating agreement provided for the initial allocations to continue until J.P. 
Morgan achieved an IRR equal to or greater than a target IRR.154  The par-
ties’ right to continue allocating income to the tax equity investor until the 
agreed after-tax IRR is achieved has been authorized by the IRS in the safe 
harbor guidelines described below.155 
As of 2013, the after-tax return on a typical tax equity investment deals 
was seven to ten percent for unlevered transactions and as high as the mid-
teens in deals with debt at the project company level.156  This return is almost 
entirely due to tax savings; tax equity investors often do not expect to receive 
more than a two percent rate of return on a pre-tax basis.157  Moreover, 
though tax equity investment has risks, tax equity investors generally do ex-
pect to receive their negotiated yield on their investment, and in this respect, 
the investment is more like debt than equity.158  The debt-like character of tax 
equity financing is not lost on industry actors, who compare the cost of tax 
equity financing to financing from commercial bank debt, mezzanine debt, 
and project bond markets.159 
After the initial period, which may be defined by reference to when the 
tax equity investor achieves its target IRR, the partners’ interests in the Pro-
ject Company will “flip.”160  The tax equity investor’s interest in the Project 
Company will drop to as low as five percent, and the wind developer will 
often hold an option to buy out that remaining interest.161  Assuming the wind 
developer exercises such an option, the tax equity investor will no longer 
have any rights in the Project Company, and all future profits will belong to 




 154. UPC Haw. LLC Agreement, supra note 129, at Annex 1 (definition of “flip 
date”). 
 155. Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 C.B. 967, at § 4.05. 
 156. Cost of Capital: 2013 Outlook, PROJECT FIN. NEWSWIRE 2 (Feb. 2013) [here-
inafter 2013 Cost of Capital], 
http://www.chadbourne.com/files/upload/OpportunityToBuyWindFarms_Kaufman_p
fn_feb13.pdf. 
 157. Sharif et al., supra note 146, at 11.  See also Martin, supra note 109. 
 158. See Martin, supra note 109. 
 159. 2013 Cost of Capital, supra note 156. 
 160. Cadwalader, Investment in Alternative Energy, supra note 143, at 2. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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By using flip partnerships and similar structures, wind developers have 
been able to monetize otherwise unusable tax credits to help finance initial 
investments in new wind projects.  The tax equity investment structure may 
be used either as a stand-alone financing structure, or in combination with 
traditional project financing or private equity contributions;163 however, in 
the past, tax equity investors have required a premium in leveraged deals that 
raises their after-tax rate of return to as high as thirteen to fifteen percent.164  
JPMorgan Capital Corporation estimated that, in 2007, roughly seventy per-
cent of the wind capacity installed in the United States was financed using tax 
equity from third-party investors.165 
Among the clearest limitations of the tax equity investment structure is 
the small pool of potential investors.  As mentioned, the number of active tax 
equity investors in the market is fewer than twenty, and in some years, has 
been fewer than a dozen.166  Wind developers’ ability to tap into tax equity 
financing is limited by the tax liabilities and available cash reserves of this 
small number of tax equity investors.167  As the projected tax liability of this 
small group of investors drops, as it is likely to do in recession years, so too 
 
 163. When project finance debt is added at the Project Company level, the struc-
ture may be referred to as “cash leveraged.”  See Bolinger et al., supra note 92, at 9–
10.  Wind developers may propose this structure either to increase their expected 
return on equity or to reduce the required amount of equity contributions.  Id. at 9.  
Tax equity investors often object, however, due to their reluctance to negotiate with 
outside lenders.  See id. at 10.  An alternative structure that is less objectionable to 
lenders is the “back leveraged” structure, which incorporates debt financing at the 
wind developer level, where it can be arranged and negotiated without any involve-
ment from the tax equity investor.  Id. at 8. 
 164. See Update: Discussion Among Six of the Largest Tax Equity Investors 
About the State of the Tax Equity Market at an Infocast Wind Finance Sum-
mit, PROJECT FIN. NEWSWIRE (Apr. 2010), http://www.chadbourne.com/Update_
Tax_Equity_Market_projectfinance/. 
 165. See RYAN WISER & MARK BOLINGER, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2008 WIND 
TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT 21 (July 2009), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fy09osti/46026.pdf. 
 166. MENDELSOHN & HARPER, supra note 43, at 9–10. 
 167. Id. 
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does the amount of money available for tax equity financing.168  As a result, 
the supply of tax equity financing can be restricted, and not all wind develop-
ers will have access to the tax equity finance source. 
Moreover, the pool of eligible tax equity investors is further limited by 
features of the tax system designed to prevent abusive tax shelters.  For ex-
ample, passive activity loss rules limit the extent to which individual inves-
tors can use the credits.169  The passive activity credit rules limit when certain 
taxpayers, including individuals, can apply tax credits earned from passive 
activities.170  Generally, the sum of credits earned from passive activities are 
disallowed to the extent they exceed the regular tax liability of the taxpayer 
allocable to passive activities.171  A “passive activity” is any activity that in-
volves the conduct of a trade or business and in which the taxpayer does not 
materially participate.172 
The IRS expressly stated in the safe harbor guidelines that the passive 
activity loss rules apply to tax equity investment transactions, and “only enti-
ties not subject to [the § 469 passive activity loss rules], and not individuals, 
will be able to offset non-project income with credits received as a passive 
investor in a partnership.”173  In other words, tax equity investors are passive 
investors that do not materially participate in the wind energy trade or busi-
ness; therefore, the passive activity credit rules limit the amount of the pro-
duction tax credit that can be used by natural-person tax equity investors. 
Though a very wealthy individual – or, more likely, a pool of such indi-
viduals – could theoretically have enough passive activity income to make a 
tax equity investment in a wind project possible, as a practical matter, indi-
viduals usually cannot act as tax equity investors.  This limitation effectively 
forecloses the possibility of a private equity fund raising significant capital 
from individual investors for the purposes of investing in wind energy.174  As 
a result, the only investors who have been incentivized to invest in wind pro-
jects are a small number of banks and a handful of large public companies 
that have been willing to partner with wind developers for the development of 
large wind projects. 
 
 168. Sharif et al., supra note 146, at 4.  In recognition of the shortage of tax equity 
investment money during the recession years, Congress passed a temporary law per-
mitting eligible wind companies to elect to receive a cash grant from the government 
in place of the production tax credit or the investment tax credit.  See id.  See al-
so Martin et al., supra note 109. 
 169. See I.R.C. § 469 (West 2016). 
 170. See id. 
 171. See id. § 469(d)(2). 
 172. “Trade or business activities” and “material participation” are defined at 26 
C.F.R. § 1.469-4 (2016) and 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5 (2016), respectively. 
 173. Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 C.B. 967, at § 4.09. 
 174. Similarly, a private equity fund may be less able to attract tax-exempt inves-
tors for the purpose of investing in wind energy because tax exempts also lack the tax 
liability needed to make the tax credits valuable.  Id. 
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For the reasons discussed in this Part, the supply of tax equity financing 
is inadequate to meet the needs of all eligible wind energy companies.  More-
over, the availability of tax equity financing is probably further depressed by 
legal uncertainties surrounding the production tax credit discussed in the next 
Part.  Without access to some form of tax equity financing, wind developers 
have a limited ability to monetize the production tax credits and fund new 
wind projects, even in years when the production tax credit is otherwise 
available.  A production tax credit that relies heavily on tax equity investment 
structures, therefore, is less effective than one that can always deliver the 
subsidy directly. 
III.  LEGAL UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING WIND TAX EQUITY 
INVESTMENT FINANCING 
A.  Sunset Provisions and Uncertainty About the Future of the Wind 
Energy Production Tax Credit 
The legal uncertainty surrounding wind energy tax equity investment fi-
nancing is owed to at least two sources.  The first area of uncertainty, which 
has been widely commented upon by academics and other observers, and will 
be touched on only briefly in this Part, relates to sunset provisions.175  Since 
the production tax credit was first introduced in 1992, the credit was subject 
to sunset provisions that require Congressional renewal to prevent the credit 
from expiring.176  The production tax credit was allowed to expire three times 
between 1999 and 2004.177  More recently, the production tax credit was al-
lowed to sunset at the end of 2014.178 
Many commentators have criticized the sunset features of the production 
tax credit.179  Lewis & Clark Law School energy law professor Melissa Pow-
ers has observed that the unstable nature of the production tax credit has neg-
atively affected the wind industry by creating instability in the labor force and 
disrupting manufacturing processes and supply chains.180 Another legal 
scholar similarly advocated for a long-term extension of the production tax 
credit on the basis that “[t]he PTC helps to determine the feasibility of future 
 
 175. See Ward, supra note 46, at 463. 
 176. Wind Energy Tax Credit Set to Expire at End of 2012, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8870. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Sammy Roth, Congress Extends Wind Tax Credit, But Only for 2 
Weeks, DESERT SUN (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.desertsun.com/story/tech/science/
energy/2014/12/16/congress-wind-tax-credit-extension/20509777/. 
 179. See, e.g., Powers, supra note 33, at 231; Walsh, supra note 41, at 235; 
Ward, supra note 46, at 463. 
 180. Powers, supra note 33, at 223. 
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wind projects; therefore, the industry’s ability to rely on its availability is 
necessary for long-terms goals of increasing production.”181 
Industry members have similarly attacked the sunset provisions as harm-
ful to the wind energy industry.  One nonprofit advocacy group observed that 
the production tax credit’s “‘on-again/off-again’ status has resulted in a 
boom-bust cycle of development.  In the years following expiration, installa-
tions dropped between 76 and 93 percent, with corresponding job losses.”182 
The American Wind and Energy Association says that the uncertainty over 
the continued availability of the credit “caused wind installations to drop 92 
percent in 2013, causing a loss of $23 billion to our economy and nearly 
30,000 well-paying jobs.”183 
Another observer noted that the production tax credit sunset provisions 
are counterproductive to any goal of promoting long-term investment in wind 
projects because “renewable energy projects are irreversible investments with 
long lead times, and therefore investors cannot easily retract their investments 
upon the expiration of the PTC.”184  In other words, because production credit 
tax equity investment deals depend on the wind project earning tax credits 
over a ten-year period, uncertainty over the availability of the credit likely 
discourages at least some investors from entering into these long-term deals.  
For this reason, the sunset provisions act to suppress the market for tax equity 
investors. 
Notably, when Congress extended the production tax credit in Decem-
ber 2015, it introduced a phase-out schedule by which the credit will be 
phased out gradually until it sunsets completely at the end of 2020.185  The 
phase-out approach has been supported by members of the wind industry, 
who say it will provide greater stability to the industry and allow it to become 
cost-competitive.186 
 
 181. Ward, supra note 46, at 487. 
 182. Production Tax Credit For Renewable Energy, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-solutions/increase-
renewables/production-tax-credit-for.html#.VXjL6EvQmgQ (last visited Feb. 22, 
2016).  But see Mann, supra note 41, at 139–40 (noting that despite the boom-bust 
cycle of the production tax credit, the amount of wind electricity generated increased 
more than sixteen-fold between the years 2000 and 2010, an increase the Department 
of Energy attributed to the availability of the production tax credit). 
 183. Federal Production Tax Credit For Wind Energy, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, 
http://www.awea.org/Advocacy/content.aspx?ItemNumber=797 (last visited July 8, 
2015). 
 184. Erin Dewey, Note, Sundown and You Better Take Care: Why Sunset Provi-
sions Harm the Renewable Energy Industry and Violate Tax Principles, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 1105, 1131–32 (2011). 
 185. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, H.R. 2029, 114th Cong. § 301 
(2015). 
 186. Analysis: Phase-out of Wind Energy Production Tax Credit Would Enable 
U.S. Industry to Become Fully Cost Competitive, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N (Dec. 12, 
2012), http://www.awea.org/MediaCenter/pressrelease.aspx?ItemNumber=4696. 
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B.  Uncertainty About Enforcement After Historic Boardwalk 
The second area of legal uncertainty – uncertainty about IRS enforce-
ment following a 2012 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruling and 
subsequent agency guidance – has received little attention in academic litera-
ture and will therefore be the focus here.  In Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. 
Commissioner, the Third Circuit applied a substance-over-form analysis to 
deny a tax equity investor the benefit of rehabilitation tax credits, reasoning 
that the parties had failed to form a real partnership but had instead engaged 
in a prohibited sale of the tax credits.187  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
relied on a facts-and-circumstances test, which was first articulated in the 
Supreme Court’s case Commissioner v. Culbertson188 and more recently ap-
plied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the TIFD III-E, 
Inc. v. United States189 (“Castle Harbour”) line of cases and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Virginia Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP 
v. Commissioner.190 
In late 2014, the IRS released its own guidance in response to Historic 
Boardwalk, creating a safe harbor for tax equity investment in rehabilitation 
tax credit deals.191  The new IRS guidance differed in several respects from 
the earlier safe harbor guidance relied upon by wind energy tax equity inves-
tors.  Though the scope of the new safe harbor is limited to tax equity invest-
ment in rehabilitation tax credits – and the earlier guidance continues to apply 
only to tax equity investment in the production tax credit by wind energy 
investors – the guidance drew close attention by tax practitioners and renew-
able energy industry observers who questioned whether it signaled a shift in 
the IRS’s position on tax equity investment transactions.192 
Though it is hard to know how Historic Boardwalk may have affected 
the tax equity investment market in wind energy, the legal uncertainty intro-
duced by the case would not inspire many new investors to enter the tax equi-
ty market.  The remainder of this Part explains the tax treatment of wind tax 
equity investment transactions prior to Historic Boardwalk and then considers 
how Historic Boardwalk and the IRS’s subsequent guidance may cast doubt 
on the future of tax equity transactions used to monetize the production tax 
credit. 
 
 187. 694 F.3d 425, 462 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 188. 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949). 
 189. 459 F.3d 220, 230  (2d Cir. 2006). 
 190. 639 F.3d 129, 136 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 191. Rev. Proc. 2014-12, 2014-3 I.R.B. 415. 
 192. See, e.g., Keith Martin & John J. Marciano, Tax Equity Market Weighs 
New IRS Guidelines, PROJECT FIN. NEWSWIRE (Feb. 2014), http://www.chad
bourne.com/TaxEquityMarketWeighs_projectfinance/. 
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1.  The Revenue Procedure 2007-65 Safe Harbor 
Historically, the tax equity investment structures used to monetize the 
production tax credit have presented the issue of whether the IRS will respect 
the parties’ attempt to allocate the credits to tax equity investors.193  Under 
Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”), partnership income, 
gain, loss, deductions, and credits are determined at the partnership level, but 
those tax items are allocated among the partners and reported on the partners’ 
individual tax returns.194  The IRS generally respects the allocations pre-
scribed by the partnership agreement;195 however, Section 704(b) authorizes 
the IRS to re-determine the allocations under certain circumstances, including 
cases when the proposed allocations lack substantial economic effect.196 
Substantial economic effect is a highly technical concept within the 
partnership tax code and regulations.  A taxpayer can establish economic 
effect by meeting three regulatory requirements.197  If these requirements are 
met and the allocation is reasonably likely to substantially affect the dollar 
amounts received from the partnership independent of tax consequences, then 
the allocation will be deemed to have substantial economic effect and no fur-
ther analysis is necessary.198  First, the partnership must maintain its capital 
accounts in compliance with the regulations.199  Second, upon liquidation, 
distributions must be “made in accordance with the positive capital account 
balances.”200  Third, partners must be required to restore any capital account 
deficits upon liquidation.201 
The first of these requirements, the capital account requirement, is not 
met by the allocations of tax credits made in tax equity investment transac-
tions.202  Under the regulations, “Allocations of tax credits and tax credit re-
capture are not reflected by adjustments to the partners’ capital accounts. . . .  
Thus, such allocations cannot have economic effect under [the capital account 
requirement].”203  For this reason, the regulations explain, tax credits and tax 
credit recapture must be allocated in accordance with the partners’ interests in 
the partnership as of the time the tax credit or credit recapture arises.204  Sec-
 
 193. See IRS Publishes Safe Harbor for Structuring Wind Partnerships, WILSON 
SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (Nov. 8, 2007), https://www.wsgr.com/
WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/clientalert_windpartners
hips.htm [hereinafter WSGR Alert]. 
 194. See I.R.C. § 704(a) (West 2016). 
 195. Id. § 704(b). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b) (as amended in 2016). 
 198. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2). 
 199. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(1). 
 200. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2). 
 201. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3). 
 202. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii). 
 203. Id. § 1.704–1(b)(4)(ii). 
 204. Id. 
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tion 704(b) authorizes the IRS to re-allocate partners’ distributive shares of 
income, gain, loss, deductions, or credits in cases when the partners’ alloca-
tions would otherwise lack “substantial economic effect.”205 
The partners’ “interests in the partnership” refers to how the partners 
have agreed to share the economic benefit or burden corresponding to the 
income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit that is allocated.206  Among the factors 
to be considered to determine the partners’ interests in the partnership are the 
partners’ relative contributions to the partnership, their relative interest in 
economic profits and losses which may differ from taxable income or loss, 
and their relative interests in cash flow and other non-liquidating distribu-
tions.207  In a tax equity transaction with allocations that are disproportionate 
to the parties’ contributions and right to cash distributions, there is a risk that 
the IRS will adjust those allocations. 
Prior to 2007, tax equity investors would ask tax counsel to provide 
“should” opinions that concluded that the allocations made under the tax eq-
uity investment structure should be respected by tax authorities.208  Until 
2006, tax advisors could also seek further assurance from the IRS by seeking 
a private letter ruling stating that the proposed allocations would be respect-
ed,209 but the IRS stopped issuing private letter rulings on any partnership tax 
issues for partnerships claiming credits under I.R.C. § 45 in 2006.210  As a 
result, despite the willingness of some tax advisors to issue opinions on the 
matter, some degree of uncertainty remained as to whether the tax equity 
investment structures employed by wind developers would survive an IRS 
challenge. 
The IRS provided some comfort to the wind industry, however, with the 
issuance of Rev. Proc. 2007-65, which announced that the IRS would not 
challenge the substantial economic effect of tax equity investment structures 
used to monetize wind energy production tax credits as long as the taxpayers 
structure the transactions according to its guidelines.  The safe harbor, which 
is specific to wind energy tax equity investment deals, “establishe[d] the re-
quirements (the Safe Harbor) under which the [IRS] will respect the alloca-
tion of § 45 wind energy production tax credits by partnerships in accordance 
with § 704(b).”211 
 
 205. I.R.C. § 704(b) (West 2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i). 
 206. Treas. Reg. § 1.704–1(b)(3) (defining “partner’s interest in the partnership”). 
 207. Id. 
 208. WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, supra note 193. 
 209. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200609002 (Nov. 2, 2005) (seeking a private 
letter ruling on treatment of a structure under which an investor does not expect to 
receive a positive cash-on-cash return on its investment, but the investor expects to 
achieve a positive return taking into account its allocation of § 45 credits). 
 210. See I.R.S. Notice 2006-88, 2006-42 I.R.B. 686 (Oct. 16, 2006). 
 211. Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 I.R.B. 967.  Among the safe harbor provisions 
are the requirements that the wind developer never own less than a one-percent inter-
est in the Project Company and that the tax equity investor must own at least five 
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The safe harbor goes a step further, however, stating: “The [IRS] gener-
ally will closely scrutinize a Project Company as a partnership or Investors as 
partners if a Project Company’s partnership agreement does not satisfy each 
requirement of this revenue procedure.”212  In other words, if a tax equity 
investor fails to comply with the revenue procedure, the IRS may not only 
exercise its authority to re-allocate the production tax credits, but it may also 
disregard the partnership structure entirely – the result that was later seen in 
Historic Boardwalk. 
The question remains, however, as to under what circumstance the IRS 
may disregard a partnership on the basis of the substance-over-form doctrine 
in a transaction that does comply with the safe harbor.  While it is tempting to 
conclude that the safe harbor forecloses the possibility, this is not necessarily 
the case.  The safe harbor promises the IRS will not challenge compliant 
transactions on the basis of IRC § 704(b), but it makes no promises as to the 
substance-over-form doctrine.  For this reason, it would be a mistake to dis-
regard the Historic Boardwalk decision and related agency guidance. 
2.  Historic Boardwalk and Substance Over Form 
Historic Boardwalk arose after the IRS recharacterized a tax-equity in-
vestment transaction used to monetize rehabilitation tax credits as an imper-
missible sale of tax credits, thereby denying the tax benefits.  Like the pro-
duction tax credit, the rehabilitation tax credit can only be claimed by a tax-
payer who owns equity in the property generating the credit.  Under the facts 
in Historic Boardwalk, the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority 
(“NJSEA”) had engaged in certain rehabilitation activities expected to gener-
ate the rehabilitation tax credit.  As a state agency, NJSEA was a tax-exempt 
entity that was unable to use the tax credits directly.213 For this reason, 
NJSEA entered into an agreement with a third-party investor with substantial 
federal income tax liability, under which the investor agreed to make capital 
contributions to an LLC named HBH in exchange for certain tax benefits, 
including the rehabilitation tax credit.214 
Through the operating agreement, the tax equity investor agreed to make 
an initial contribution, followed by three additional contributions that were 
contingent upon completion of certain project-related events, including con-
firmation of the amount of rehabilitation costs that would qualify for the cred-
it.215  The tax equity investor was entitled to cash distributions for the follow-
ing purposes: repayment of an “investor loan” it extended to the partnership; 
a three percent preferred return from any cash flow available after the loan 
 
percent of the Project Company during any period when it owns an interest in the 
project.  Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Comm’r, 694 F.3d 425, 433 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 214. Id. at 437–38. 
 215. Id. 
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payment to offset any tax owed on income allocations; and the balance of any 
remaining cash after certain distributions were made to NJSEA.216 
In addition, the parties entered into several option agreements and a tax 
benefits guaranty that protected the tax equity investor’s return.  First, they 
entered into options that could be exercised in the event of a default, under 
which the tax equity investor’s interest would be purchased at an amount 
equal to the projected tax benefits and cash distributions.217  Second, they 
entered into put and call options that set the purchase price of the tax equity 
investor’s interest at the greater of 99.9% of the fair market value of its mem-
bership interest in HBH, or any accrued and unpaid preferred return due.218  
Third, the parties entered into a tax benefits guaranty that required NJSEA to 
compensate the tax equity investor in the event that the IRS denied its bene-
fits.219 
The IRS audited HBH’s information return220 for the years from 2000 to 
2002, at which time it reallocated all partnership items from the tax equity 
investor to NJSEA.221  The IRS denied the tax equity investor the partnership 
benefits on two grounds.  First, HBH should not be recognized as a partner-
ship because it was formed for “the express purpose of improperly passing 
along tax benefits” to the tax equity investor and was therefore a sham trans-
action.222 Second, the tax equity investor’s “interest in HBH was not . . . a 
bona fide partnership participation because PB had no meaningful stake in the 
success or failure of HBH.”223 
The tax court rejected both of the Commissioner’s arguments.  With re-
spect to the IRS’s first assertion, the tax court reasoned that the transaction 
was not a sham transaction because both NJSEA and the tax equity investor 
would receive a net economic benefit from the transaction, and therefore, the 
transaction had economic substance.224  The tax court similarly rejected the 
IRS’s second assertion that the tax equity investor was not a bona fide partner 
on the grounds that the tax equity investor had accepted at least some small 
economic risk, and the parties had diligently documented the transaction.225 
 
 216. Id. at 438. 
 217. Id. at 438–39. 
 218. Id. at 441. 
 219. Id. at 441–42. 
 220. Although partnerships are pass-through entities that do not pay income tax, 
they are nevertheless required to file a Form 1065 U.S. Return of Partnership Income 
on which the partnership must report entity-level income to the IRS for informational 
purposes.  See Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Form-1065,-U.S.-Return-of-Partnership-Income (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2016). 
 221. Historic Boardwalk, 694 F.3d at 444–45. 
 222. Id. at 445. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 445–46. 
 225. Id. at 446–47. 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the tax court’s 
decision, focusing on the IRS’s argument that the tax equity investor was not 
a bona fide partner.226  In reaching its conclusion, the court applied the Cul-
bertson test, under which it analyzed the totality of the circumstance to de-
termine whether they “truly reflect[ed] an intent to share in the profits or 
losses of an enterprise or, instead, ‘[we]re either illusory or insignificant.’”227  
The court’s legal analysis was further supported by the Second Circuit’s con-
tention in Castle Harbor that “whether an interest has the prevailing character 
of debt or equity can be helpful in analyzing whether, for tax purposes, the 
interest should be deemed a bona fide equity participation.”228  The focus of 
the debt or equity analysis was on the extent of the investor’s lack of down-
side risk and lack of upside potential in the partnership. 
Similarly, the Historic Boardwalk court cited the Fourth Circuit’s rea-
soning in Virginia Historic, which likened the investor’s risk to the type of 
risk assumed “by any advance purchaser who pays for an item with a promise 
of later delivery.”229  The Fourth Circuit in Virginia Historic reasoned that 
this kind of risk differs from the “risk of the entrepreneur who puts money 
into a venture with the hope that it might grow in amount but with the 
knowledge that it may well shrink.”230  This lack of entrepreneurial risk was 
deemed to lean against characterization of the investment as equity.  Finally, 
the Third Circuit in Historic Boardwalk quoted the Fourth Circuit’s state-
ment: 
We reach this conclusion mindful of the fact that it is “the policy of 
the Federal Government” to “assist State and local governments . . . to 
expand and accelerate their historic preservation programs and activi-
ties.”  And we find no fault in the Tax Court’s conclusion that both the 
Funds and the Funds’ investors engaged in the challenged transactions 
with the partial goal of aiding Virginia’s historic rehabilitation efforts.  
But Virginia’s Historic Rehabilitation Program is not under attack 
here.231 
Accordingly, the Historic Boardwalk court proceeded with its analysis of the 
underlying tax equity investment transaction with “awareness of the legisla-
tive policy of providing tax credits to spur private investment in historic re-
habilitation projects.”232 
 
 226. Id. at 448. 
 227. Id. at 449 (quoting TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 
F.3d 220, 231 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 228. Id. at 450 (quoting Castle Harbour, 459 F.3d at 232). 
 229. Id. at 453 (quoting Va. Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP v. Comm’r, 639 
F.3d 129, 145–46 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 230. Id. (quoting Va. Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP, 639 F.3d at 145–46). 
 231. Id. at 452 (citation omitted) (quoting Va. Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP, 
639 F.3d at 146 n.20). 
 232. Id. 
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The court first observed that the tax equity investor had “no meaningful 
downside risk” because, practically speaking, it was certain to recover its 
contribution and to receive the tax credits or their cash equivalent.233  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court explained that the tax equity investor had 
assumed very little investment risk because it was not required to make an 
installment contribution until NJSEA had showed that the project had pro-
gressed enough to generate a sufficient amount of credits.234  Second, the 
court found that the Tax Benefits Guaranty had eliminated any audit risk that 
the tax equity investor would lose its economic benefit due to IRS challenge.  
Additionally, the court noted that the rehabilitation project had already been 
fully funded before the tax equity investor had entered the deal, minimizing 
any project risk that the credit would not be earned due to a failure to com-
plete any part of the project.235 
Having concluded that the tax equity investor had effectively eliminated 
all investment risk, audit risk, and project risk, the court explained that the tax 
equity investor and NJSEA “in substance, did not join together in HBH’s 
stated business purpose—to rehabilitate and operate the East Hall.  Rather, 
the parties’ focus from the very beginning was to effect a sale and purchase of 
HRTCs.”236  This characterization was further bolstered by the court’s subse-
quent findings that the tax equity investor’s avoidance of downside risk was 
accompanied by “a dearth of any meaningful upside potential.”237 
Finally, the court dismissed the parties’ partnership formalities and 
communications as form, not substance.  In substance, the court concluded, 
the transaction with the tax equity investor had been a sale of historic rehabil-
itation tax credits.238  The court held that “after looking at the substance” of 
the transaction, because the tax equity investor “lacked a meaningful stake in 
the success or failure of HBH, it was not a bona fide partner.”239 
3.  The IRS Response: Revenue Procedure 2014-12 
After the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion in Historic Boardwalk, at 
least some members of the renewable energy community “took a momentary 
pause to re-evaluate current tax equity structures used in solar, wind, geo-
 
 233. Id. at 455. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 456. 
 236. Id. at 458. 
 237. Id. at 459. 
 238. Id. at 462 (quoting TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle Harbour), 459 
F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006)) (“From the moment Sovereign approached NJSEA, the sub-
stance of any transaction with a corporate investor was calculated to be a ‘sale of . . . 
historic rehabilitation tax credits.’. . .  And in the end, that is what the substance 
turned out to be.”). 
 239. Id. at 463. 
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thermal, biomass, etc. deals.”240  Most commentators concluded that the pro-
duction tax credit deals prevalent in the wind industry, which by then almost 
always conformed to the IRS’s safe harbor, would continue to be respected 
after Historic Boardwalk.241  Nevertheless, the renewable energy industry 
waited eagerly for IRS guidance following the ruling. 
Such guidance came in January 2014 in the form of Rev. Proc. 2014-12, 
which set forth a safe harbor for tax equity investments in the rehabilitation 
tax credit.  Rev. Proc. 2014-12 parallels the wind safe harbor in several re-
spects.  Both safe harbors require the developer to retain at least a one percent 
interest in partnership income, gain, loss, deductions, and credits.242  Both 
also prohibit the tax equity investor’s interest from dropping below five per-
cent in each such item for the taxable year when its percentage share of that 
item is the largest.243 
On the other hand, Rev. Proc. 2014-12 departs from the wind safe har-
bor in several areas.  The most significant of these departures is the express 
requirement that the tax equity investor’s partnership interest constitutes a 
“bona fide equity investment with a reasonably anticipated value . . . separate 
from any federal, state, and local tax deductions, allowances, credits, and 
other tax attributes to be allocated by the Partnership to the Investor.”244  The 
revenue procedure explains that an interest is a bona fide equity interest if the 
“reasonably anticipated value is contingent upon the Partnership’s net in-
come, gain, and loss, and is not substantially fixed in amount.”245  The inves-
tor must not be “substantially protected” from economic losses from partner-
ship activities, and its participation in partnership profits must not be limited 
to a preferred return that is in the nature of a payment for capital. 246 
In other words, to satisfy the safe harbor, the tax equity investor’s inter-
est must be, in substance, equity and not debt.  Not only is this a vague re-
quirement compared to the bright-line rules that are more commonly associ-
ated with safe harbors, but it also should not be too comforting to a taxpayer 
hoping to use the safe harbor to ensure its investment is respected as equity 
 
 240. John Marciano, Supremes: No Re-Consideration of Historic Boardwalk, 
PROJECT FIN. NEWSWIRE (May 28, 2013), http://www.pfnewswire.com/2013/05/
supremes-no-re-consideration-of.html. 
 241. Forrest David Milder, The Current: Historic Boardwalk Hall – What Does it 
Mean for Renewable Energy?, NOVOGRADAC J. TAX CREDITS (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.novoco.com/journal/2011/02/news_retc_201102.php (“If properly struc-
tured, an investor can have a great level of comfort that its investment will be respect-
ed following this decision.”).  Marciano, supra note 240 (“Most transactions are very 
far from the aggressive structure used in the case the Third Circuit considered.”). 
 242. Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 I.R.B. 967, at § 4; Rev. Proc. 2014-12, 2014-3 
I.R.B. 415, at § 4.02(2)(a). 
 243. Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 I.R.B. 967, at § 4; Rev. Proc. 2014-12, 2014-3 
I.R.B. 415, at § 4.02(2)(a). 
 244. Rev. Proc. 2014-12, 2014-3 I.R.B. 415, at § 4.02(2)(b). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
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and not debt.  Essentially, the safe harbor requires that taxpayers remain 
mindful of the debt-versus-equity analyses set forth in Historic Boardwalk, 
Castle Harbor, and Virginia Historic.  Failure to do so could result in the 
investment being recharacterized as debt, causing the partnership structure to 
be disregarded. 
Several other requirements in Rev. Proc. 2014-12 can be understood as 
supporting this general “bona fide equity” requirement.247  First, the parties 
may not reduce the value of the tax equity investor’s interest through unrea-
sonable fee arrangements.248  For example, the partners may not divert cash 
to the developer through unreasonably large development fees that reduce the 
tax equity investor’s residual interest in the partnership, significantly limiting 
its upside potential.  To do so would again cause the interest to look more like 
debt than equity because equity holders should be entitled to residual income 
after creditors have been paid.  Though the purpose behind this requirement 
seems clear enough, the “unreasonableness” standard once again stops short 
of a bright-line rule for investors to follow. 
Whereas the reasonable-fees requirement as intended to ensure the tax 
equity investor has meaningful upside potential in the partnership, several 
other requirements seek to ensure that the tax equity investor assume mean-
ingful downside risk.  First, like the wind safe harbor, Rev. Proc. 2014-12 
requires the tax equity investor to contribute at least twenty percent of its total 
expected contributions before the date when the property generating the tax 
credits is placed in service, at which point the credit becomes significantly 
more certain.249  Similarly, Rev. Proc. 2014-12 mandates that at least seventy-
five percent of the investor’s total capital contributions be fixed in amount 
before the date when the property is placed in service.250  Finally, it prohibits 
guarantees that would make the tax equity investor economically whole in the 
event of an IRS challenge,251 and it limits the use of options and other con-
tractual rights that would enable the tax equity investor to sell its investment 
for anything other than fair market value.252 
Thus, Rev. Proc. 2014-12 contains a series of requirements intended to 
ensure that the tax equity investor retains both meaningful upside potential 
and meaningful downside risk – two characteristics that are important indica-
tors that an interest has the qualities of an equity investment and not a debt 
investment.  Many of these requirements were already incorporated in the 
wind safe harbor, but some were not.  Given the similarities between the 
transactions used to monetize the rehabilitation tax credit at issue in Historic 
Boardwalk and the transactions used to monetize the production tax credit, 
 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at § 4.02(2)(c). 
 249. Id. at § 4.03. 
 250. Id. at § 4.04.  This requirement parallels the same requirement in the wind 
safe harbor.  See Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 I.R.B. 967, at § 4.04. 
 251. Rev. Proc. 2014-12, 2014-3 I.R.B. 415, at § 4.05(a). 
 252. Id. at § 4.06. 
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the newer IRS guidance should not be ignored.  Rather, the guidance high-
lights the IRS’s continued attention to substance over form and the need to 
structure tax equity investments carefully in order to avoid the recharacteriza-
tion of the transaction as an impermissible sale of tax credits. 
In general, wind industry observers have taken the IRS at its word inso-
far as it stated in Rev. Proc. 2014-12 that it did not “intend the inclusion of 
any particular criterion in the Safe Harbor to be an indication either of our 
views of the significance of that criterion with respect to any other federal or 
state tax credit transactions.”253  Early predictions were that the new safe har-
bor would be unlikely to have much effect on the broader tax equity market, 
but that the renewable energy industry should nevertheless reflect upon the 
“new lines” the IRS had drawn.254  Lance Markowitz, the Senior Vice Presi-
dent and head of leasing and asset finance for Union Bank, was quoted as 
saying that the Historic Boardwalk guidance had not affected how he was 
structuring tax equity investment deals, “but [he] underst[ood] that there are a 
few general principles behind that guidance that people will at least pause to 
think about when doing future deals.”255 
The practical impact of the Historic Boardwalk guidance on the preex-
isting wind tax equity investment market may have been small; however, the 
guidance reflects the thin line walked by tax equity investors between legiti-
mate investments and abusive transactions.  Because tax equity investors will 
almost always conform their transactions to the IRS safe harbor guidelines, 
there is little practical concern that the transactions will be set aside.  Never-
theless, the safe harbors probably amount to little more than the IRS’s con-
cession to the fact that the production tax credit would be unable to serve its 
legislative purpose unless tax equity transactions are permitted. 
So far, the IRS has chosen not to challenge tax equity investment trans-
actions as long as the taxpayer satisfies the terms of its safe harbor.  The large 
banks and corporations that participate in tax equity investment transactions 
have presumably achieved comfort that their transactions will continue to be 
respected by the IRS.  It is hard to say, however, whether the complicated 
legal status of the transactions might discourage new entrants to the tax equi-
ty investment market.  At minimum, the legal uncertainties make it all the 
more necessary to engage experienced advisors whose fees present a barrier 
to entry for smaller investors.256 
 
 253. Id. at § 3.  See, e.g., Keith Martin & John Marciano, IRS Sheds Additional 
Light On New Tax Equity Guidelines – Rev. Proc. 2014-12, Historic Boardwalk, 
Section 47 Tax Credits, Partnership Flips, Inverted Leases, CHADBOURNE & PARKE 
LLP (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.chadbourne.com/IRS-SHEDS-ADDITIONAL-
LIGHT-ON-NEW-TAX-EQUITY-GUIDELINES--Rev-Proc-2014-12-Historic-
Boardwalk-Section-47-Tax-Credits-Partnership-Flips-Inverted-Leases-01-06-2014. 
 254. Martin & Marciano, supra note 253. 
 255. See 2014 Cost of Capital, supra note 20, at 4. 
 256. Kristin Broughton, Small Banks Finally Have Cost-Effective Way to Make 
Solar Investments, AM. BANKER (June 5, 2015, 2:58 PM), http://www.american
banker.com/news/community-banking/small-banks-finally-have-cost-effective-way-
41
Layser: Improving Tax Incentives for Wind
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
494 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Thus, wind energy developers’ continued reliance on tax equity financ-
ing is bad for the industry because it depends upon a limited pool of capital 
that is unlikely to grow significantly.  Legal changes could minimize the bar-
riers to tax equity investment discussed in this Part, such as an amendment to 
the passive activity credit rules, the elimination of sunset provisions, or a new 
wind safe harbor that addresses the substance-over-form issue more directly.  
However, the next Part demonstrates that tax equity financing is bad for wind 
energy for a second reason: it drives part of the subsidy away from wind de-
velopers.  For this reason and others, the next Part rejects proposals to expand 
the availability of tax equity financings and argues that a better proposal 
would eliminate the need for tax equity financing by making the production 
tax credit refundable. 
IV.  THE CASE FOR A REFUNDABLE WIND ENERGY PRODUCTION TAX 
CREDIT 
A.  The Nonrefundable Wind Energy Production Tax Credit Is a    
Poorly Targeted Subsidy 
Observers have generally agreed that features of the production tax 
credit limit the extent to which wind developers can benefit from the subsidy.  
To date, most of the proposals to improve the production tax credit have been 
aimed toward expanding the tax equity investment market by removing barri-
ers to investment.  For example, commentators have proposed that the passive 
activity limitations be modified to exempt passive investment in wind pro-
jects, thereby expanding the potential field of tax equity investors.257  This 
proposal may have merit to the extent that tax equity investment structures 
continue to be necessary.258 
 
to-make-solar-investments-1074733-1.html (“Steep legal fees used to make it difficult 
for smaller banks to investment [sic] in renewable energy tax credits.”). 
 257. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 46, at 480–83.  A proponent of this change ob-
served that one may object to “special treatment for a particular industry” or, perhaps 
more importantly, that “amending the passive income rules for only for [sic] wind 
energy will unduly hamper the development of other [production tax credit]-eligible 
technologies.”  Id. at 482.  These concerns are relatively easy to address.  First, such 
an exemption could be written to exclude the production tax credit from the definition 
of “passive activity credit,” thereby exempting other renewable energy projects in 
addition to wind.  Second, the production tax credit already benefits certain industries 
over others, and to the extent that such treatment is already justified, so are corre-
sponding tax law changes that support it use. 
 258. However, one should continue to question any credit that requires carve-outs 
from anti-abuse rules in order to make it effective.  The monetization of the produc-
tion tax credit is most commonly achieved through purely tax-motivated passive in-
vestments that may generate little economic return apart from tax savings.  See supra 
note 146 and accompanying text.  The extremely small field of tax equity investors 
includes companies like Google that have become infamous in recent years for ag-
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However, the underlying goal to expand the tax equity investment mar-
ket should be questioned.  Investment in wind farms by tax equity investors 
may be consistent with congressional intent to incentivize wind energy in-
vestment, but a production tax credit that depends on such transactions re-
flects poor tax policy.  New York University Law School tax law professor 
Lily Batchelder and her co-authors Fred Goldberg and Peter Orszag have set 
forth several guiding principles for designing an effective, efficient tax credit 
justified on efficiency grounds.259 
The first of these principles is that a subsidy like the production tax 
credit, which is intended to correct for positive externalities, “should be tar-
geted in such a way that society gets the most ‘bang for its buck.’”260  The 
two factors that affect this analysis are responsiveness to the subsidy and 
elasticity.261  Subsidies should be disproportionately directed at the group 
whose behavior generates the most positive externalities or whose behavior is 
most elastic with respect to the price of the activity.262   
As discussed in Part II.A, the energy sector is an inefficient market due 
to negative externalities – pollution, especially carbon – produced by tradi-
tional energy companies.  Renewable energy companies like wind energy 
producers are disadvantaged due to negative externalities, and unless subsi-
dized, they are also likely to under-perform activities that produce positive 
 
gressive tax planning techniques.  See Jesse Drucker, Google Revenues Sheltered in 
No-Tax Bermuda Soar to $10 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-10/google-revenues-sheltered-in-no-tax-
bermuda-soar-to-10-billion.html.  On the spectrum of tax reduction strategies, tax-
motivated investments in wind projects may be among the most socially beneficial of 
tax shelters.  Tax equity investments are not considered abusive for this reason.  Nev-
ertheless, tax equity investments come very close to the line, as evidenced by the 
Historic Boardwalk decision and guidance.  See supra part III.B.2.  That the wind 
industry relies so heavily on its own safe harbor suggests some discomfort about 
whether the transactions would otherwise be respected.  See supra Part III.B.3.  An 
amendment to the passive activity credit rule that exempts passive investments in 
wind projects from the standard anti-abuse rules may be similarly justified, but it 
would nevertheless reflect an unusual tax policy decision. 
 259. See generally Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The 
Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23 (2006).  As discussed in Part 
II.A of this Article, the production tax credit is justified as a subsidy needed to correct 
market inefficiencies caused by externalities the energy sector.  See supra Part II.A. 
 260. Batchelder, supra note 259, at 46. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id.  Given these principals, it would be fair to ask whether forms of renewa-
ble energy other than wind may generate more positive externalities or be more elas-
tic with respect to price.  The answer to this question would help policymakers under-
stand how to best target the production tax credit in the presence of cost constraints.  
See Batchelder, supra note 259, at 45–46.  In other words, the production tax credit 
would not have to benefit renewable energy technologies equally, but could rather 
target the renewable energy technology that results in the most carbon offset (or 
which responds most significantly to changes in price).  The analysis required to an-
swer this question is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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externalities such as carbon offsets.  Corrective subsidies can reduce the inef-
ficiencies in the energy sector by making renewable energy activities more 
profitable. 
In fact, history has shown that wind energy producers in particular are 
highly responsive to the availability of tax subsidies.263  In other words, wind 
energy producers generate significant positive externalities that help reduce 
the negative externalities present in the energy sector, and they are highly 
elastic with respect to the price of wind energy production.  The production 
tax credit should therefore be carefully targeted to renewable energy produc-
ers – in this case, wind energy producers – over other groups.264 
A production tax credit that relies on tax equity investment structures for 
monetization of the subsidy does not deliver as targeted a subsidy as alterna-
tives that may deliver the subsidy without the use of tax equity investment 
structures.  Tax equity structures drive money away from wind projects: some 
of the value of the subsidy is shifted to tax equity investors in the form of 
investment yields; some of the value is shifted to the teams of lawyers, ac-
countants, and consultants who diligence and negotiate these transactions; 
and some of the value may simply be wasted if it goes unmonetized.265  To 
the extent that tax equity investment financing shifts value away from wind 
projects, the subsidy delivered through the production tax credit is rendered 
less effective than it would be if such structures were not needed. 
This is not to say, however, that the entire cost of capital in tax equity 
investment structures represents misdirected value.  Wind developers can and 
should use their subsidies to pay debt service.  Whenever a subsidy for wind 
development is delivered via tax credit, it can be assumed that many wind 
developers must endeavor to convert the future cash flows from the credit 
into present value that can be used for investments and expenses before the 
company is generating wind energy.  Lost value, then, is only problematic 
insofar as the current design of the production tax credit limits wind develop-
ers’ monetization options to tax equity investment structures that cost more 
 
 263. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 264. This Article does not address the larger questions about whether renewable 
energy technologies should be subsidized equally.  See supra note 262.  Columbia 
Law School tax professor Michael Graetz has noted that wind energy is most likely to 
displace natural gas, while geothermal-generated electricity is more likely to displace 
coal.  See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICA’S 
ENVIRONMENT, SECURITY, AND INDEPENDENCE 190 (2011); see also Schizer, supra 
note 36, at 38.  Since coal is responsible for more greenhouse gas emissions than 
natural gas, it may make sense to subsidize geothermal-energy more heavily than 
wind energy.  See id. at 19 (noting that ‘natural gas pollutes the air much less than 
coal”). 
 265. While it might be argued that such diligence is desirable in that it allows the 
market to properly allocate the subsidies toward projects that are most likely to be 
successful, it is important to note that much of the diligence is likely to be duplicative; 
traditional project finance lenders, who are often still involved in financing these 
same wind deals, require much of the same diligence.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
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than traditional, non-tax equity financing options.  To the extent that wind 
energy developers incur extra costs due to such tax equity investment ar-
rangements, those extra costs represent a misdirected portion of the subsidy. 
To understand the cost of tax equity investment, then, it is instructive to 
compare the cost of tax equity investment financing to the commercial bank 
funding that may be available if developers were able to borrow against the 
value of the credit.  For example, assume a developer owns a 30 MW wind 
farm like the one owned by UPC Hawaii.  Assume further that the developer 
expects the wind farm to operate at twenty-percent capacity in order to earn 
up to $1,208,880 in production tax credits per eligible year, or up to 
$12,088,800 over the ten-year period.266  Because we know the typical re-
quired rate of return on tax equity investments from 2013,267 we can make a 
reasonable guess as to the relative cost of tax equity financing and commer-
cial bank loans in the same year. 
The cost of credit for commercial bank loans in 2013 was roughly 250 
basis points over the one-year LIBOR rate, which averaged 0.683% that 
year.268  Therefore, if the wind developer were able to borrow against the 
anticipated value of the credit, then the cost of credit would have been ap-
proximately 3.183% annually.  Given its required 3.183% annual interest 
rate, a commercial bank would be willing to lend up to $10,216,350,269 which 
the wind developer could invest in its wind project.  As the wind farm earned 
the expected $1,208,880 per year in production tax credits, the wind develop-
er could use that annual cash flow to service the loan.  With this information, 
a simplified amortization schedule can be generated using a publicly available 




 266. In one year, a 30MW wind farm operating at full capacity could produce 
megawatt-hours equal to 365 days x 24 hours x 30 megawatt-hours = 262,800 mega-
watt-hours.  If the wind farm operates at 20 percent capacity, it will produce 52,560 
megawatt-hours (or 52,560,000 kilowatt-hours) of electricity during that period.  See 
Capacity Factor, PARTNERSHIPS FOR RENEWABLES, http://www.pfr.co.uk/pfr/3/
Renewable-Energy/15/Wind-Power/119/Capacity-Factor/ (last visited May 14, 2016).  
The amount of the production tax credit generated each year would equal 2.3 cents 
per 52,560,000 kilowatt-hours, or $1,208,880.00. 
 267. See supra text accompanying note 156. 
 268. 2013 Cost of Capital, supra note 156. 
 269. $10,216,350 is the Net Present Value of the expected cash flows, discounted 
at 3.183%. 
 270. See Amortization Schedule Calculator, PINE GROVE, http://www.pine-
grove.com/online-calculators/amortization-schedule.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).  
The author calculated these values using the following assumptions: $10,216,350 
initial loan amount; 3.1830% annual interest rate; ten payments, with the first pay-
ment occurring one year after the loan date; annual payment frequency; compounding 
annually. 
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TABLE 1: 
Amortization Schedule for Commercial Bank Loan with 3.183% Annual   
Interest Rate 
 
Yr Payment Principal Interest Balance 
0 - - - $10,216,350 
1 1,208,880 883,694 325,186 9,332,657 
2 1,208,880 911,822 297,058 8,420,835 
3 1,208,880 940,845 268,035 7,479,990 
4 1,208,880 970,792 238,088 6,509,199 
5 1,208,880 1,001,692 207,188 5,507,506 
6 1,208,880 1,033,576 175,304 4,473,930 
7 1,208,880 1,066,475 142,405 3,407,456 
8 1,208,880 1,100,421 108,459 2,307,035 
9 1,208,880 1,135,447 73,433 1,171,588 
10 1,208,880 1,171,588 37,292 0 
 $12,088,800 $10,216,350 $1,872,450  
 
Because the production tax credit cannot be used to collateralize a 
commercial loan, however, the wind developer must instead monetize the 
credit via tax equity investment financing.  Unlike the fixed returns on bank 
loans, anticipated returns on capital investments are measured by IRR.  The 
parties will size the initial investment to equal the present value of anticipated 
future cash flows, discounted at the required rate of return. 
In the case of tax equity investment structures, there are usually four 
items that must be considered in the financial model: the tax credits the tax 
equity investor will receive, the cash it will receive – from both operating 
income and the anticipated price of a buy-out of its equity interest upon exit – 
and its anticipated cash savings from depreciation and interest deductions.271  
For the purpose of this analysis, however, only the value of the production tax 
credit will be considered.  This allows isolation of the amount of financing 
solely attributable to the existence of the production tax credit subsidy so that 
the result can be directly compared to the commercial bank loan scenario 
described above. 
The target IRR on tax equity investment financings in 2013 was seven 
to ten percent.272  For the sake of this example, assume that the target after-
tax IRR is ten percent.  Tax equity investors almost always require at least a 
two percent pre-tax rate of return;273 therefore, we can assume that some por-
tion of the after-tax return is based on income other than tax attributes.  If we 
assume: (i) the pre-tax return is two percent and (ii) the tax equity investor’s 
tax rate is thirty-five percent, then the after-tax return on that non-tax eco-
 
 271. See Martin, supra note 126. 
 272. 2013 Cost of Capital, supra note 156. 
 273. Id. 
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nomic return equals 1.3%.274  The remainder of the ten percent target IRR 
(8.7%) must therefore be attributable solely to the production tax credit.  For 
this reason, the amount of the investment attributable to the production tax 
credit in this example can be determined by discounting the future value of 










Amount of PTC276 
Discounted Value 
of PTC (r = .087) 
0 ($7,783,066) - - 
1  1,196,791 1,101,004 
2  1,196,791 1,012,883 
3  1,196,791 931,815 
4  1,196,791 857,235 
5  1,196,791 788,625 
6  1,196,791 725,506 
7  1,196,791 667,439 
8  1,196,791 614,019 
9  1,196,791 564,875 
10  1,196,791 519,664 
  $11,967,911 $7,783,066 
 
In reality, the actual size of the production tax credit earned each year 
may vary considerably depending on wind energy production; any creditor 
must, at minimum, assume some risk that the wind simply does not blow.  
Most tax equity investors mitigate some of this risk by naming a flip date that 
will not occur until the target IRR is reached.  Moreover, the models used to 
size tax equity investments are highly complex, the domain of skilled ac-
countants and costly tax advisors.  For the purposes of a one-to-one compari-
son with the hypothetical traditional lender described above, however, it 
makes sense here to use a model that projects a steady amount of production 
tax credits earned over a ten-year period. 
With these caveats in mind, this example illustrates that a wind develop-
er that is reliant on tax equity investment to monetize the production tax cred-
it is economically disadvantaged in at least two respects.  First, because tax 
 
 274. The after-tax rate of return equals the pre-tax rate of return (0.02) multiplied 
by the portion of the yield retained after taxes, which at the 35% tax rate is 65%.  In 
other words: (0.02)(0.65) = 0.13. 
 275. Calculations by author. 
 276. Note that under the safe harbor guidelines, the tax equity investor may only 
receive up to ninety-nine percent of the production tax credits.  See supra notes 143–
45 and accompanying text. 
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equity investment transactions are limited by the safe harbor requirement that 
the developer retain at least a one percent allocation of the credit, the amount 
available to “collateralize” the financing is limited to ninety-nine percent of 
the anticipated value of the credit.  In the example, $120,890 of the subsidy’s 
value is unavailable for use as collateral; therefore, that value will be lost 
unless the wind developer is able to absorb the credit directly, because it is 
unable to monetize that portion of the credit.277 
Second, the wind developer must pay a greater cost of capital to finance 
its transaction using a tax equity investment arrangement as compared to fi-
nancing through a commercial bank.  In the example, the cost of capital in the 
tax equity investment transaction was $2,312,394 higher than the cost to fi-
nance the transaction via a commercial bank loan.  In other words, even be-
fore legal fees, accountant fees, and other transaction costs are considered, the 
tax equity financing caused a loss of value to the hypothetical wind energy 
developer of $2,433,284 relative to financing through a commercial bank 





 277. Note that it may be possible for the wind developer to carry forward the tax 
credits to years when it has sufficient tax liability to absorb the credit; however, the 
credit would lose value over that period due to the discount rate. 
 278. Calculations by author. 
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TABLE 3: 
Cost of Capital of Commercial Bank Loan vs. Tax Equity Investment 
 
 













Amount of credit availa-
ble to creditor/investor  
   
2
       
      Per eligible year $1,208,880 $1,196,791 $12,089 
3
   
      Over ten year period $12,088,800 $11,967,910 $120,890 
4 
Net Present Value of 
available production tax 
credit (3) at annual dis-
count rate (1) over 10 
year period279 
$10,216,350 $7,783,066  
5 Cost of Capital (3) – (4) $1,872,450 $4,184,844 $2,312,394 
6 
Total lost subsidy over 10 
year period due to tax 
equity financing (3) + (5) 
  $2,433,284 
 
As suggested above, the professional fees associated with tax equity in-
vestment also are significant.  A director of renewable energy finance at Bank 
of America estimated that some of the more complex tax equity investment 
transactions could cost as much as $3 million to $4 million in professional 
fees to close the transaction.280  A study conducted through the University of 
Michigan observed that for some investors, “the time and financial cost of 
utilizing the PTC significantly reduced the value of the tax credit to the pro-
ject.”281  The researchers concluded that the professional costs associated 
 
 279. The net present value = [$1,208,880/1+r] + [$1,208,880/(1+r)2] + . . . + 
[$1,208,880/(1+r)10], where r is the discount rate.  The annual discount rate for the 
commercial bank loan is 0.05683, and the annual discount rate for the tax equity in-
vestment is 0.09. 
 280. State of the Tax Equity Market, PROJECT FIN. NEWSWIRE (May 2012), 
http://www.chadbourne.com/StateofTaxEquityMarket_May12_Projectfinance/. 
 281. MICHAEL C. BARATOFF ET. AL., RENEWABLE POWER, POLICY, AND THE COST 
OF CAPITAL: IMPROVING CAPITAL MARKET EFFICIENCY TO SUPPORT RENEWABLE 
POWER GENERATION PROJECTS 38 (Apr. 2007), http://www.erb.umich.edu/
Research/Student-Research/Renewables_Policy_and_the_Cost_of_Capital.pdf. 
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with tax equity investment made the transactions unattractive with respect to 
smaller deals.282 
Given the transaction costs of tax equity investment financing, one de-
veloper estimated that the threshold deal size for tax equity investment deals 
was between fifty and sixty million dollars.283  Assume that professional fees 
add a premium of about three percent to the cost of capital, as is suggested by 
some observers.284  In the example above, the estimated transaction costs 
would be roughly $822,677 on top of the $4,184,844 cost of credit, driving 
still more money away from the wind project.285 
As this Part has demonstrated, the costs of tax equity financing are sig-
nificant relative to more traditional financing options.  These extra costs re-
flect the part of the value of the subsidy that is shifted away from wind devel-
opers.  Some of the subsidy is misdirected to tax equity investors that serve 
the same basic function as traditional lenders but charge a greater cost of cap-
ital.  Some of the subsidy is shifted toward highly specialized lawyers, ac-
countants, and other advisors who have expertise in tax equity investment and 
charge significant fees for their services. 
While some misdirection of a subsidy may be tolerated if unavoidable, it 
is poor tax policy to design a tax credit that predictably misdirects the subsidy 
when an alternative design would result in a more targeted subsidy.  To the 
extent that the value of the credits is shifted to tax equity investors and other 
third parties that do not produce wind energy, the credits fail to deliver the 
full subsidy to wind developers.  Tax equity investment structures drive value 
away from wind farms and toward passive investors and third-party advisors; 
therefore, a production tax credit that relies heavily on tax equity investment 
structures for monetization is rendered less effective because part of the sub-
sidy fails to reach the externality-producing recipient. 
As stated above, it is probably impossible to determine the socially op-
timal amount of carbon or the correct size of the production tax credit that 
would result in sufficient wind energy production to offset pollution and re-
store socially optimal levels of greenhouse gases.286  Nevertheless, one can 
deduce that whatever the optimal level, it is suboptimal to have the benefits 
misdirected through needlessly costly structures or to third parties.  The pro-
duction tax credit could be made more effective by eliminating the need for 
tax equity investment structures and implementing a design that more careful-
ly targets the subsidy toward wind energy producers.  Making the credit re-
fundable could eliminate the need for tax equity investment structures and 
their associated transaction costs. 
The nonrefundable design of the production tax credit is a significant 
limitation because it ensures that only taxpayers with projected tax liabilities 
 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See Mormann, supra note 91, at 332. 
 285. Calculations by author. 
 286. See Walsh, supra note 41 at 480–82. 
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can receive the full benefit from the subsidy.287  The credit may have little 
immediate value to wind developers in the absence of the complex tax equity 
investment structures used to monetize the credit because they often have 
little or no tax liability in the early years.  As explained below, this basic 
problem – and the tax equity investment structures that misdirect the subsidy 
– could be eliminated with a simple design change: make the production tax 
credit refundable. 
B.  A More Effective Alternative: The Refundable Wind Energy      
Production Tax Credit 
1.  The Practical Case for a Refundable Credit: A Better Targeted  
Subsidy 
A simple change that would lessen – or even eliminate – the need for tax 
equity investors is to make the production tax credit refundable.  Currently, 
the production tax credit is a nonrefundable credit, which means it can only 
be used to offset existing tax liability.288  To the extent a taxpayer has no re-
maining tax liability, the credit has no further value.  As previously discussed, 
this feature makes the credit unavailable to wind developers that, in the early 
stages of a wind project, often have insufficient tax liability to absorb the 
credit.289  This practical reality drives the need for tax equity investor part-
ners, creating a market where wind farm developers are willing to pay a pre-
mium to monetize the production tax credit. 
In contrast, refundable credits are not limited by existing tax liability.  
Rather, refundable credits enable the government to deliver a tax subsidy to 
eligible taxpayers without regard to tax liability.290  To the extent that a tax-
payer has insufficient tax liability to absorb the credit, any remaining availa-
ble credit is given to the taxpayer in the form of a tax refund.291  Making the 
production tax credit refundable, therefore, would allow wind developers to 
receive the full value of the credit, even if the developer has no current tax 
liability. 
A refundable version of the production tax credit could also eliminate 
the need for tax equity investment as a source of financing.  As discussed in 
 
 287. See supra note 90. 
 288. See SHERLOCK, supra note 14. 
 289. See Publication 596, Earned Income Credit (EIC), IRS (2015), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p596.pdf. 
 290. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), IRS, https://www.irs.com/articles/
earned-income-tax-credit-eitc (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
 291. The most well-known refundable credit is the earned income tax credit, 
which is available to certain low-income taxpayers who typically have no income tax 
liability.  Id.  Such taxpayers receive the value of their earned income tax credit 
through a tax refund when they submit their tax returns.  See Publication 596, Earned 
Income Credit (EIC), supra note 290. 
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Part II.B.1, under current law, the production tax credit has limited use to 
traditional lenders.292  Project finance creditors lend against the value of the 
project assets and its expected cash flow; however, because the project com-
pany is a pass-through entity, the credits cannot generate project-level cash 
flow.  Similarly, the wind developer may be unable to convert the credit into 
cash due to its own low tax liability, and creditors cannot count on the credit 
to become a valuable source of cash flow.  Thus, as a practical matter, the 
production tax credit cannot be used as collateral by a wind energy developer 
that is unable to absorb the credit on its own. 
Meanwhile, the creditors’ status as non-equity holders disqualifies them 
from using the credits directly.293  Granted, in the event of default, the credi-
tor would foreclose on the project and become an equity holder.  Neverthe-
less, a bank would not typically hold the project for long before selling the 
assets in a foreclosure sale, so it is unlikely that the bank would remain eligi-
ble to claim the credit.  Furthermore, the production tax credit is unattractive 
collateral because the bank would be unable to separate them from other as-
sets and sell them to third party buyers because such buyers would also fail 
the equity-holder requirement.294 
In contrast, a refundable production tax credit would generate real cash 
flows to all eligible wind energy developers, regardless of their tax profiles 
because the credit would no longer be limited by the wind developers’ tax 
liability.295  As such, a creditor may be willing to lend money directly to the 
 
 292. See supra notes 109–11. 
 293. I.R.C. § 45(a)(2)(A)(i) (West 2016) (specifying that the credit is earned by 
“qualified facilities”); id. § 45(d)(1) (limiting “qualified facilities” for wind energy 
facilities to those “owned” by the taxpayer). 
 294. See Christopher K. Odinet, Testing the Reach of UCC Article 9: The Ques-
tion of Tax Credit Collateral in Secured Transactions, 64 S.C. L. REV. 143, 179–80 
(2012) (footnotes omitted) (“[S]ome credits, even though they can be substantively 
transferred, cannot be procedurally transferred for use as collateral. Specifically, 
many tax credits can be transferred only through an allocation to the members of the 
taxpayer. . . .  Not just any third party can receive the credits; that party must have an 
equity interest in the entity that is entitled to the credits, and the transfer must come 
through the allocation of tax benefits to the members.  In such a case, the credits are 
substantively transferable, but there would be no way to procedurally allow the cred-
its to be seized by a creditor in the event of a default.”). 
 295. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS 1 (Jan. 2013), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/43767
_RefundableTaxCredits_2012_0_0.pdf (“Whereas other preferences reduce the 
amount of taxes owed to the government, refundable credits can result in net pay-
ments from the government.  Specifically, if the amount of a refundable tax credit 
exceeds a filer’s tax liability before that credit is applied, the government pays the 
excess to that person or business.”).  Like the current production tax credit, a refunda-
ble version of the credit would continue to be unavailable for use as collateral at the 
Project Company level unless the ownership restriction were also lifted; however, a 
developer could nevertheless choose to add additional leverage at the holding compa-
ny level by borrowing against the credit. 
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wind developer, secured by the anticipated cash flow from the production tax 
credit.296  In other words, because the refundable tax credit would be expected 
to generate cash flow to the developer, a lender may be willing to extend 
credit directly to the wind developer that is secured by that anticipated cash 
flow.  Alternatively, a lender may be willing to extend more credit at the Pro-
ject Company level if the developer guarantees to make certain future contri-
butions to the Project Company using cash earned from the credit.297  Figure 
C below shows the different levels of financing. 
 
 296. See Odinet, supra note 294, at 149 (explaining that tax credits are “all the 
rage” in secured transactions).  The behavior of borrowers and lenders during the 
years when the § 1603 “cash grant” was available supports the prediction that at least 
some creditors may be willing to lend against expected cash flow from a renewable 
energy tax credit.  Following the 2008 financial crisis, tax equity investment was 
largely unavailable because so few would-be tax equity investors had sufficient tax 
liability to absorb the tax credits.  Warren Lilien et al., Bridges to US Cash Grants, 
LATHAM & WATKINS 1 (2011), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/bridges-to-us-
grants-for-renewable-energy-pf.  Congress enacted a temporary “cash grant” option 
under which wind energy producers could elect to receive direct cash outlays from the 
government in lieu of the tax credits.  Id.  During that period, there was a market for 
“cash grant bridge loans,” which were loans secured by the anticipated cash flow 
from the cash grant.  Id. (“[M]any developers have turned to short or medium-term 
financing from commercial lenders to fund the construction of renewable energy 
projects expected to qualify under grant criteria, opening up a substantial market for 
cash grant bridge loans.  These loans are typically secured by, and anticipated to be 
paid with the proceeds of, expected cash grants.”).  Lenders are often willing to ac-
cept tax credits as collateral for loans.  See Odinet, supra note 294, at 149 (“More and 
more lenders want a security interest in actual tax credits as a way to secure the 
loan.”).   If a lender were to foreclose on the project in the event of default, it may 
satisfy the ownership requirement and would be able to use the credit directly; how-
ever, the ownership restriction would still prevent the lender from selling the credits 
to non-owner third parties. 
 297. Under current law, project finance lenders are sometimes willing to extend 
capital on this basis, but the covenant must be between the lender and the tax equity 
investor.  See Bolinger et al., supra note 92, at 10–11 (“[L]enders typically require 
that the Tax Investor provide a contingent guarantee to make periodic additional equi-
ty investments into the project company on an as-needed basis.  The amount of such 
injections for any period is capped at the amount of PTCs actually generated in that 
period . . . .  Such injections essentially create a second contingent cash flow stream 
that lenders are willing to rely upon to support an incremental PTC loan.”).  Since tax 
equity investors are not usually willing to enter into such an agreement with lenders, 
this option is rarely available.  Id. at 11 (“[T]he inclusion of a PTC tranche of debt 
limits the pool of potentially interested Tax Investors still further, because few Tax 
Investors have been willing to assume the contingent obligation surrounding future 
capital contributions.”). 
53
Layser: Improving Tax Incentives for Wind
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
506 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
FIGURE C 
 
Amending the tax code to provide for a refundable production tax credit, 
therefore, would end the need for tax equity investors to raise capital.  In-
stead, developers could retain equity ownership of wind projects and supple-
ment their equity contributions with debt financing as needed.  Though the 
developer who incorporates borrowing would continue to incur transaction 
costs and would be required to pay interest on the debt, debt financing has 
advantages over the tax equity investment structure.  First, any interest ex-
penses would be tax deductible, potentially making the cost of capital lower 
for debt than for equity.298  This means that, even though both tax equity in-
vestors and creditors would demand a return on their investment, the devel-
oper may be able to retain more of the credit’s value under the debt scenario 
due to the corporate interest deduction.299  Second, debt financing allows the 
developer to leverage its equity investments to increase its rate of return.300  
This possibility is not entirely unavailable under current law; however, tax 
equity investors often object to the involvement of outside lenders.301  When 
no tax equity investor is involved, the developer should have a greater flexi-
bility to incorporate debt financing as needed. 
A refundable production tax credit, therefore, would be more effective 
than the existing credit both for the purpose of increasing the rate of return on 
wind projects and for enabling developers to attract necessary financing for 
new wind projects.  By more carefully targeting the subsidy toward wind 
projects, the refundable production tax credit would more effectively incen-
tivize the development needed to encourage wind energy production and, 
ultimately, the displacement of greenhouse gas producing energy sources. 
 
 298. Id. at 32. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 43. 
 301. Id. at 10 (“The use of debt on a project can, however, limit the pool of Tax 
Investors that are willing to invest.  Some Tax Investors do not want to have to con-
tend with a lender in case a project encounters financial stress. . . .  Due largely to the 
Tax Investor concerns described above, levered structures (i.e., those with debt at the 
project level) have been in the minority for financing wind projects in the U.S.”). 
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2.  The Theoretical Case for a Refundable Credit: A More Simple,   
Efficient, and Equitable Subsidy 
 
Furthermore, a refundable production tax credit would not only consti-
tute a better-targeted, more effective subsidy, but it would also be consistent 
with good tax policy.  Three important policy goals of taxation are simplicity, 
efficiency, and equity.302  A refundable tax credit is consistent with the first 
of these goals since reducing the prevalence of complex tax equity investment 
transactions would greatly simplify the application of the production tax cred-
it.  The other two policy goals merit a lengthier discussion. 
Batchelder, Goldgerg, and Orszag have analyzed refundable tax credits 
on efficiency grounds in the context of the individual income tax.  In that 
context, they concluded that “the optimal tax incentive generally should apply 
uniformly across the income distribution unless there is evidence that mar-
ginal externalities generated by the subsidy or marginal responsiveness to the 
subsidy vary by income class.”303 
To reach this conclusion, they first consider the impact of nonrefunda-
bility on externalities and elasticity, the two factors that help identify a well-
targeted subsidy.304  They observed that “[i]t is extremely unlikely that exter-
nalities and elasticities change in an abrupt and discontinuous fashion exactly 
at the point of zero income tax liability or the marginal tax rate thresholds.”305  
It is similarly unlikely that insufficient tax liability to absorb the production 
tax credit correlates with wind energy producers that generate fewer positive 
externalities via carbon offsets or that respond less readily to the subsidy. 
Small wind energy producers may be less likely to have significant tax 
liability than their larger counterparts; however, there is no reason to assume 
that the wind energy produced by small wind farms produces less carbon 
offset, kilowatt-for-kilowatt, relative to larger wind energy producers.306  
Rather, the amount of carbon offset will vary based on location and the type 
of traditional energy displaced by wind energy.  A megawatt of wind energy 
generated by a small wind farm owned by a low tax-liability developer in one 
 
 302. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2006) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Three Goals]. 
 303. Batchelder et al., supra note 259, at 46–47. 
 304. Id. at 28. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Since all wind energy producers earn the production tax credit at the same 
rate, based on the number of kilowatts of energy produced, it makes sense to consider 
the relative externalities produced based on a kilowatt-versus-kilowatt comparison, as 
opposed to a project versus project comparison.  See Production Tax Credit For Re-
newable Energy, supra note 182. 
 306. See Kathryn Sarkis, How Carbon Projects Can Bring Story to Your Sustain-
ability Program, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.triplepundit.com/special/
guide-to-carbon-offsetting/projects-can-bring-story-carbon-offsets/. 
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location may produce more positive externalities than a megawatt of wind 
energy generated by a second, larger developer with greater tax liability. 
Furthermore, if large energy producers appear to respond more readily 
to the production tax credit, this is likely because the cost of monetizing the 
production tax credit presents a barrier to smaller wind energy developers.  A 
refundable production tax credit should be equally – if not more – attractive 
to small wind developers with little tax liability as it is to larger developers.  
In short, the taxable income of wind energy developers likely has little or no 
impact on their ability to generate positive externalities or their likelihood to 
respond to the credit, so there is no good tax policy reason for subsidizing 
wind energy developers differently based on their taxable income. 
Batchelder, Goldberg, and Orszag further argue that uniform subsidies 
like refundable tax credits are most economically efficient absent evidence of 
how externalities and elasticities vary because “under the most reasonable set 
of default assumptions, they minimize the expected deadweight loss generat-
ed by errors in the incentive’s application.”307  Using a traditional economic 
analysis, the authors demonstrate that when a distribution of externalities is 
unknown – for example across income cohorts (e.g., potential recipients of a 
subsidy may generate different levels of a positive externality) – a uniform 
subsidy like a refundable tax credit minimizes deadweight loss due to uncor-
rected externalities caused by subsidy shortfalls.308 
Under these principles, it is reasonable to conclude that a refundable 
credit that delivers a uniform subsidy to wind energy producers would be 
more efficient than its nonrefundable counterpart because the distribution of 
externalities in this context is unknown.  As discussed in Part II.A.2, the 
amount of carbon offset by wind farms will vary based on a number of fac-
tors, including location and the characteristics of the traditional energy dis-
placed by wind energy.309  One could argue that the subsidy should be higher 
in regions where it will be more effective; however, given the variety of fac-
tors that affect the amount of carbon offset, predicting the locations where the 
subsidy will be most effective would be difficult.  Meanwhile, there is no 
indication that the income-level of a wind energy producer has any effect on 
carbon offset.  A uniform subsidy that minimizes deadweight loss across the 
group would therefore be preferable over a subsidy given to some wind ener-
gy producers but not others based on taxable income.310 
In its nonrefundable form, the production tax credit is uniform on its 
face, but as a practical matter, it does not deliver a uniform subsidy because 
wind energy producers that earn the same size of credit through wind energy 
 
 307. Batchelder et al., supra note 259, at 47.  Deadweight loss, in the context of 
subsidies, refers to uncorrected externalities.  See id. 
 308. Id.  But see David M. Schizer, Limiting Tax Expenditures, 68 TAX L. REV. 
275, 347–48 (2015) (arguing that the analysis set forth by Batchelder, Goldberg, and 
Orszag “no longer holds when we have at least some sense of which income cohort 
should be funded”). 
 309. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
 310. Batchelder et al., supra note 259, at 47–48. 
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production may nevertheless receive varying amounts of the subsidy depend-
ing on their tax liability.  In other words, even if wind energy producers could 
earn the subsidy at the same rate, they would not all receive the full subsidy 
earned because their ability to absorb the subsidy varies.  Furthermore, the 
above analysis demonstrated that tax equity investment transactions used to 
monetize the nonrefundable credit also prevent the full subsidy from reaching 
the wind energy producers.  Thus, the production tax credit is not uniform 
but, rather, is dependent on the tax liability of the taxpayer. 
The production tax credit could be transformed into a uniform subsidy, 
however, by making the credit refundable.  The absolute size of the subsidy 
will continue to vary as wind farms produce varying amounts of the wind 
energy, but each wind energy producer would nevertheless earn the same 
amount of credit based on the amount of wind energy earned, kilowatt-for-
kilowatt.  This would be true regardless of the tax liability of the taxpayer.  
Making the production tax credit refundable would improve the credit to de-
liver a uniform, more efficient subsidy. 
A refundable subsidy may also be more equitable than the nonrefunda-
ble version.  The equity goal of tax law is traditionally evaluated in terms of 
horizontal equity and vertical equity.311  Horizontal equity is the principal that 
like taxpayers should be taxed similarly, whereas vertical equity holds that 
relative tax burdens should be based on taxpayers’ ability to pay.312  At the 
entity level, a refundable credit would be more equitable than a nonrefunda-
ble credit.  First, horizontal equity would increase because all like wind ener-
gy companies would have access to the tax benefit, regardless of their level of 
taxable income.  Second, vertical equity would increase because the tax bene-
fit would no longer be disproportionately available to taxpayers with greater 
tax liability, which are often the largest, most profitable companies.  That 
said, empirical research would be needed to assess the broader distributional 
effects of this proposal, because the ultimate tax incidence of the production 
tax credit is not necessarily known.313 
 
3.  Responding to Potential Objections to a Refundable Credit 
 
Potential objections to a refundable production tax credit include: oppo-
sition to use of the tax system to deliver subsidies; the need to limit the size 
of the credit in order to avoid wasteful spending; the possibility of taxpayer 
abuses; and to a lesser degree, resistance to wealth distribution via the tax 
system and commitment to the civic duty of all citizens to pay some income 
tax. 
 
 311. Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income 
Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 73 (1977). 
 312. Id. at 79–83. 
 313. See infra note 351 and accompanying text. 
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The first objection to a refundable production tax credit – that the tax 
system should not be used to deliver subsidies and that the administration of 
the credit would offset any efficiency gains – is a philosophical argument 
about the purpose of the income tax.  This view reflects the perspective of 
Stanley Surrey that taxation should be used strictly for revenue-raising pur-
poses and any other use of the tax system is bad tax policy.314  Surrey coined 
the term “tax expenditures” to describe subsidies delivered through the tax 
system.315  Tax incentives like the production tax credit would generally fall 
within the scope of Surrey’s tax expenditures because the credit does not 
raise revenue, but instead delivers a subsidy intended to alter taxpayer behav-
ior.316 
Many experts have accepted Surrey’s premise that taxation should not 
be used to further regulatory goals, but some tax experts recently have argued 
that tax incentives are appropriate in some contexts.317  University of South-
ern California Law School tax professor Edward Kleinbard has stated that 
when government intervention is warranted, then the choice between direct 
regulation or tax-based tools depends on which is easier to administer, which 
is most fair, and which is best targeted to solving the problems without un-
necessary additional burdens.318  Similarly, University of Michigan Law 
School tax professor Reuven Avi-Yonah has argued that it is not only ac-
ceptable to regulate via the tax system, but it may even be preferable when 
alternatives would be less effective or more difficult to administer.319 
In the context of combating climate change, observers generally have 
agreed that tax incentives and disincentives are more effective and easy to 
administer than non-tax alternatives, and history has shown that the produc-
tion tax credit has been one of the most politically viable tax-based options.320  
Direct regulation in this context “has generally been rejected because of a 
wide consensus that the government does not have the necessary information 
to ensure that [greenhouse gas] emissions targets are distributed most effec-
 
 314. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 6 (1973).  See also Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation, supra note 
18, at 3. 
 315. SURREY, supra note 314.  The boundaries of the tax expenditure concept 
have been controversial, however, since tax expenditures are defined relative to a 
baseline that critics say is hard to define.  See also Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regula-
tion, supra note 18, at 3. 
 316. See Mann, supra note 41, at 136 (“Tax expenditures, also called tax incen-
tives, are economic instruments that operate to change the cost of a particular activity 
by reducing the tax burden on taxpayers engaging in the favored activity.  Thus, re-
newable energy tax incentives operate by reducing the cost of generating electricity 
using renewable sources.”). 
 317. Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation, supra note 18, at 3. 
 318. KLEINBARD, supra note 51, at 8. 
 319. Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation, supra note 18, at 4. 
 320. See Mann, supra note 41, at 14. 
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tively among private market actors.”321  The main other non-tax tool to regu-
late climate-change has been some version of cap and trade programs.  While 
potentially more effective than the production tax credit, cap and trade pro-
grams tend to be dismissed by tax experts as too costly to administer and too 
difficult to enforce.322 
In contrast, taxes and transfers through the tax system can be enforced 
by IRS staff, who already have mechanisms for enforcement in place, without 
the need to form new administrative agencies.  The carbon tax, a classic 
Pigouvian tax placed directly on greenhouse gas emissions, probably would 
be more effective and just as easy to administer as the production tax credit, 
but it tends to be politically unacceptable.323  The production tax credit faces 
political hurdles as well, as evidenced by its repeated sunsets.324  Historically, 
however, it has been more politically acceptable than the carbon tax, and it is 
likely to continue to be the most politically acceptable option in the future.325  
Subsidizing wind energy through tax credits is not necessarily bad tax policy, 
therefore, because it may be the most effective, most easily administered tool 
for promoting clean energy production that is also reasonably politically via-
ble. 
Nevertheless, many politicians and academics propose scaling back tax 
expenditures to help cut the deficit,326 and few knowingly would argue in 
favor of wasteful subsidies.  For this reason, a second objection to the refund-
able production tax credit is that it would remove the built-in limit on the size 
of the credit.  Refundable tax credits can and often do have limits, howev-
er.327  A well-designed refundable production tax credit could incorporate 
limits that are reasonably related to the ways the production tax credit – re-
fundable or not – is most likely to result in waste. 
The first possibility for wastefulness is if the credit subsidizes wind en-
ergy production that would occur anyway.328  To the extent that the govern-
ment subsidizes activity that would have occurred without the credit, a subsi-
 
 321. Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation, supra note 18, at 4. 
 322. See id. at 5. 
 323. See Mann, supra note 41, at 141 (footnote omitted) (“Imposing consumption 
taxes, such as a carbon tax, on environmentally damaging goods would more effi-
ciently encourage alternatives to fossil fuel use.  However, the United States has not 
embraced the idea of pollution taxes, preferring instead the path of least legislative 
resistance: tax incentives.”). 
 324. See Brad Plumer, From NASCAR to Wind Power: Congress Just Let 55 Tax 
Breaks Expire, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2014/01/02/from-nascar-to-wind-power-congress-just-let-55-tax-breaks-
expire/. 
 325. Cullen, supra note 39, at 129. 
 326. Schizer, supra note 308, at 285. 
 327. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFF., REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS 6 (2013), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/43767_
RefundableTaxCredits_2012_0_0.pdf. 
 328. Schizer, supra note 308, at 295. 
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dy is wasteful.329  One way to address this problem would be to tie the subsi-
dy partly to the profitability of the wind companies.  The subsidy could be 
made available until the company becomes independently profitable, at which 
point the credit could be phased out or even subject to recapture.330  When a 
credit is subject to recapture provisions, a taxpayer may be required to pay 
back money received through tax credits in previous years. 
The second possibility for waste is if wind energy companies are subsi-
dized for producing energy beyond what is needed to meet demand.  The 
production tax credit may over-incentivize wind energy production during 
periods of low demand.331  A particularly striking example of this was seen in 
September 2015 when wholesale energy prices in Texas reached negative 
$8.52.332  The reason for the unusually low wholesale prices was that wind 
energy producers had paid to place their energy on the power grid during a 
time of extremely low demand.333  They were able to afford, and even profit, 
from the deal because they expected to receive federal production tax credit 
money as a result of “selling” the energy.334 
This problem has nothing to do with whether the credit is refundable, 
and it has everything to do with the fact that the credit incentivizes a proxy.  
Columbia University Law Professor David M. Schizer has suggested tying 
the subsidy more closely to the desired activity, which is the replacement of 
greenhouse gas producing energy.335  Alternatively, Schizer would recom-
mend adding a requirement that electricity would not be eligible for tax cred-
its unless it sells for a minimum price.336  A refundable production tax credit 
should similarly include some feature that eliminates or phases out the subsi-
dy as demand declines. 
A third objection to the refundable production tax credit is that refunda-
ble tax credits are subject to taxpayer fraud and abuse.337  This has been par-
ticularly true with respect to the earned income tax credit, which is a large 
refundable tax credit program intended to subsidize low income earners.338  
Erroneous payments based on refundable tax credits can be particularly frus-
trating to correct since the IRS must endeavor to cause taxpayers to repay 
 
 329. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of 
Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 992–93 (1986). 
 330. See id. 
 331. See infra note 354 and accompanying text. 
 332. See Daniel Gross, The Night They Drove the Price of Electricity Down, 
SLATE (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_juice/2015/09/
texas_electricity_goes_negative_wind_power_was_so_plentiful_one_night_that.html. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. See Schizer, supra note 36, at 37.  See also supra Part II.A. 
 336. Schizer, supra note 36, at 37. 
 337. See Fraud, IRS, https://www.eitc.irs.gov/Tax-Preparer-Toolkit/faqs/fraud 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (estimating that between twenty-one and twenty-six per-
cent of EITC claims are paid in error). 
 338. Id. 
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money paid to them.  In light of these problems, it could be argued that tax 
equity investors act as gatekeepers who monitor the taxpayers’ behavior to 
ensure their investment remains sound.  The notion that tax equity investors 
are policing the tax activities of wind companies is probably overly optimis-
tic, however, and it distracts from larger administrative issues related to the 
credit. 
The Government Accountability Office observed that the IRS is not re-
quired to collect project-level data from all the taxpayers it supports with the 
production tax credit. 339  In fact, the IRS merely requires taxpayers to report 
the total amount of the credit they are claiming for eligible wind projects, and 
as a result, the IRS has very little information about individual projects, and 
there is no way to confirm how much generating capacity the credit is sup-
porting.340  It should be emphasized that these challenges to enforcement are 
present under current law and are not related to questions of refundability. 
Rather than relying – somewhat dubiously – on tax equity investors to 
enforce the tax law, the IRS should require documented proof that projects 
are both eligible for the credit and have completed the requisite energy sales.  
Given the high dollar amounts at stake, it would be reasonable to impose 
recordkeeping requirements on wind companies, and some states already 
have similar requirements under state tax law.  Utah, for example, requires 
companies to provide documentation to certify that a project is eligible for the 
state law version of the production tax credit, and it requires them to submit 
copies of energy sale invoices when they claim the credit.341  The IRS should 
impose similar requirements and should regularly audit wind projects in order 
to discourage abuses of the production tax credit, regardless of whether the 
credit is made refundable. 
The fourth objection criticizes the government’s redistribution of wealth 
through a combination of taxation and spending.342  Tax experts differ in their 
views about the appropriate level of redistribution of wealth via the tax sys-
tem.343  Some object to any tax and spending program that collects money 
from one group and redistributes it to another, less well-off group of taxpay-
ers.344  This objection is amplified in the context of refundable tax credits in 
the individual income tax context because refundable credits allow some tax-
payers who are too poor to owe taxes to instead collect money from the gov-
ernment.345 
In the context of the production tax credit, however, the distribution 
question is complicated by the fact that a refundable tax credit claimed by a 
 
 339. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ELECTRICITY GENERATION PROJECTS: 
ADDITIONAL DATA COULD IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 27 (Apr. 2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669881.pdf. 
 340. Id. 
 341. See UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 362-2 (2015). 
 342. Avi-Yonah, Three Goals, supra note 302, at 3. 
 343. See KAPLOW, supra note 53. 
 344. Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation, supra note 18, at 2. 
 345. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 327, at 3. 
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“poor” wind energy company is an economic benefit that ultimately may be 
enjoyed by the company’s relatively wealthy shareholders.346  For this reason, 
one may be tempted to object to a refundable production tax credit for wind 
energy producers on the basis that the wealthy shareholders of wind energy 
companies should not be the ultimate recipients of redistributed wealth.347  
This objection may have some merit if it can be conclusively shown that the 
benefits and burdens of a corporate income tax inure to wealthy corporate 
shareholders.348 
However, redistribution-based objections are less applicable in the con-
text of business taxation because any broader distributive goals can be ad-
dressed through the individual income tax system.349  Avi-Yonah has argued 
that each form of taxation should be used to advance one primary goal.350  In 
his view, the individual income tax should be used to redistribute wealth, 
while corporate taxation should serve a regulatory purpose.351  For example, a 
carbon tax may be used to discourage businesses from emitting harmful 
greenhouse gases, while a subsidy like the production tax credit serves to 
encourage companies to invest in renewable energy like wind.352  In either 
case, the corporate tax or subsidy would properly function to regulate corpo-
rate behavior through taxation and tax incentives.353  The refundable design 
should be preferred without regard to its distributional effect because a re-
fundable production tax credit would more effectively advance its regulatory 
goals; the burden of achieving wealth distribution goals should be left to the 
 
 346. The issue of the tax incidence of corporate taxation is one of the classic theo-
retical questions debated by lawyers and economists.  See William A. Klein, The 
Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer’s View of a Problem in Econom-
ics, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 576, 576 (1965) (“[A]nyone concerned with the wisdom of the 
corporation income tax must ask himself which individual are richer and which are 
poorer by virtue of the imposition of the tax.  Does the tax result in lower profits for 
shareholders, higher prices for consumers, lower wages for workers, lower salaries for 
executives, or lower prices paid to suppliers, or some combination of these?  In the 
language of economics, what is the tax’s ‘incidence’?”). 
 347. See id. at 277. 
 348. See Kimberly A. Clausing, The Future of the Corporate Tax, 66 TAX L. REV. 
419, 430 (2013) (“While it remains possible that labor bears some of the corporate tax 
burden, and the relationship is not just discernible using aggregate data, there are also 
several reasons why capital may continue to bear the corporate tax burden.”). 
 349. Additionally, note that distributive arguments are largely irrelevant in the 
context of an economic efficiency analysis, which seeks to maximize the total dollar 
amount without regard to who receives those dollars.  See Klein, supra note 346, at 
277 (“One concerned with economic growth is most likely to ask questions bearing 
on how the tax affects returns to capital.”). 
 350. Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation, supra note 18, at 3. 
 351. Id. at 7. 
 352. Id. at 4. 
 353. Id. at 7. 
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individual income tax system, which is presumably better suited to achieve 
redistribution.354 
A fifth potential objection that “all Americans have a civic duty to pay 
at least some income tax . . . so that they feel some stake in governmental 
decisions” is better applied in the context of the individual income tax and is 
largely inapplicable here.355  Though many members of the public are un-
doubtedly frustrated by stories of large corporate taxpayers that escape signif-
icant tax liability through aggressive tax planning strategies, it would be a 
mistake to confuse corporate taxpayers’ legal obligations under the tax code 
with civic duties associated with personhood.  Although corporations and 
other business entities play a significant role in lobbying and enjoy First 
Amendment protection with respect to political speech,356 business associa-
tions are not voting citizens, so the underlying rationale to this objection is 
inapplicable. Furthermore, a negative tax at the company level does not imply 
that the natural persons who bear the ultimate burden of the business tax are 
paying no taxes.357  This objection to the refundable production tax credit, 
therefore, largely can be disregarded. 
Apart from the potential objections described above, the production tax 
credit faces strong political forces that undoubtedly work against the adoption 
of a refundable version of the production tax credit.  The recent sunset phase 
of the production tax credit reflects Congressional resistance to government 
spending programs and reluctance among conservative politicians to promote 
investment in clean energy over traditional forms of energy.358  Moreover, the 
fact that the production tax credit has not been refundable despite clear prob-
lems with the nonrefundable version of the credit likely reflects political con-
troversy around the credit generally, combined with broader resistance to 
refundable credits.359  Nevertheless, the proposal has powerful supporters, 
and versions of the refundable production tax credit continue to appear in the 
Obama Administration’s revenue proposals.360  A refundable production tax 
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 355. Batchelder et al., supra note 259, at 66. 
 356. See Citizen’s United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2009) (“The Court has thus 
rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other associations 
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 358. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
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Giegerich, The Monetization of Business Tax Credits, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 709, 726–27 
(2012). 
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credit would constitute a more effective tax credit and, more broadly, better 
tax policy. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The production tax credit has delivered sizeable subsidies to the wind 
industry since its introduction in 1992.  Opponents to the production tax cred-
it argue that the credit is no longer needed, that it distorts competition in the 
energy market, and that lawmakers should allow the credit to expire perma-
nently.  In the absence of an alternative policy solution to address market 
failure caused by greenhouse gas emissions by fossil fuel companies, howev-
er, this would be a mistake.  This Article argues that the production tax credit 
should be amended to make it a refundable tax credit. 
Renewable energy producers face significant disadvantages relative to 
traditional energy industries due to longstanding regulation and policies fa-
voring fossil fuels.  Even when such structural disadvantages are ignored, 
however, renewable energy companies are rendered unable to fully compete 
with traditional energy producers due to market failure in the energy industry. 
Traditional energy production is associated with negative externalities in the 
form of greenhouse gases that not only make fossil fuel prices artificially low 
relative to renewable energy sources like wind energy, but also inflict serious 
harms on society by contributing to climate change. 
The production tax credit is a tax incentive that can be used to mitigate 
the economic and environmental harms caused by greenhouse gas emissions 
in the energy industry.  Future research should examine whether the produc-
tion tax credit successfully incentivizes the renewable energy technology 
most likely to effectively combat climate change.  This Article focuses specif-
ically on wind energy.  In this context, this Article shows that, under current 
law, features of the production tax credit limit its efficacy.  Specifically, the 
nonrefundable nature of the credit limits wind developers’ ability to use the 
credit in the absence of complex tax equity financing structures designed to 
monetize the credit.  Use of tax equity financing by the wind energy industry 
introduces significant transaction costs that drive money away from wind 
projects.  Tax equity transactions also shift some of the subsidy’s value to-
ward a small number of large, cash-rich investment banks and corporations 
whose participation in the deals is motivated primarily by the opportunity to 
reduce taxes owed from unrelated activities. 
As a result, the production tax credit in practice is a poorly targeted sub-
sidy that is not as effective as it could be if it were refundable.  Furthermore, 
a refundable tax credit would better advance efficiency goals of taxation be-
cause uniform refundable credits generally are more efficient than nonrefund-
able credits in cases when variations in the amount of positive externalities 
are hard to predict.  Because the level of positive externalities produced by 
any given wind farm depend upon a number of factors that are difficult to 
anticipate, including the amount and type of traditional energy displaced, a 
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uniform refundable credit to wind energy producers is probably the most effi-
cient design. 
For these reasons, the production tax credit should be amended to make 
the credit refundable.  A refundable production tax credit could reduce, or 
even eliminate, the need for tax equity financing, thereby rendering the credit 
more effective and better able to promote market efficiency and fight climate 
change. 
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